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Foreword
More than 630,000 people have fled Syria to Jordan since the start of the Syrian 
crisis in 2011, making it one of the most important host countries alongside 
Turkey and Lebanon. While many in the Jordanian government are trying hard 
to provide a safe space for Syrians seeking refuge there, mainstream discourse 
in Jordan is becoming disturbingly discriminatory, racist and anti-refugee. “The 
Syrian refugees are a burden on Jordan” has become a common refrain. Indeed, 
at times it seems as if Syrians are being held personally responsible for all of 
manifold challenges that Jordan currently faces. From rising poverty and income 
inequality to increasing levels of unemployment, social tension and violence, 
someone somewhere in Jordan has declared it to be the Syrians’ fault.
Jordan is not alone in this shift. Similar developments are not only found in the 
public discourse of Syria’s other neighbours, but also in that of many European 
states. Many in Germany, for example, are certain that the country is being 
overwhelmed by the huge number of people – many of them Syrian – currently 
seeking succor there. Anti-migrant rhetoric and hate speech, including attacks 
on asylum seekers’ homes, have become troublingly frequent and a source of 
serious concern for the German authorities. 
The Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung works to combat racism and discrimination 
however and wherever they occur. Our pursuit of this goal within the context of 
the Syrian refugee crisis has led us to produce this book, which seeks to amplify 
alternative and critical voices that stand in solidarity with the refugees despite all 
of the challenges posed by the influx of such a large number of people. It is our 
hope that this book not only serves as a source of progressive knowledge on the 
topic of the Syrian refugee crisis, but also a source of inspiration for activists, aid 
workers, and other actors going forward.
On behalf of the RLS, I would like to thank Bashar Al-Khatib and Dr. Katharina 
Lenner for conducting and editing the interviews compiled in this publication, for 
their passionate approach to the topic, and not least for their success in portraying 
these alternatives. I would also like to thank the interviewees who shared their 
thoughts with us, taking time out of their days to enrich our understanding of the 
complex questions at hand. I very much hope that, with this publication, we will 
be able to connect Jordan with the critical debates currently taking place with 
regard to the movement of migrants and refugees across space and borders. 
Dr. Katja Hermann 
Director 
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Regional Office Palestine 
October 2015
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7Introduction: Alternative 
voices on the Syrian 
refugee crisis in Jordan
Over the past five years we have been privy to many private and professional 
conversations about refugees in Jordan, as well as avid observers of official and 
media discourse on the Syrian refugee crisis. During this time we have often 
felt that critical voices were missing from these discussions, ones that stood 
in solidarity with the refugees rather than across from them, and hoped for an 
opportunity to somehow give them a platform from which to speak. We have 
found such an opportunity in this book produced with the Rosa Luxemburg 
Stiftung Regional Office Palestine. 
With this publication, we seek to engage with some of the most common tropes 
of the discussion, which tend to portray the Syrian presence in Jordan as negative 
and burdensome, and to offer alternative perspectives. We thought the best way to 
do this was by letting a number of Jordanian and Syrian voices that are personally 
and / or professionally connected with the Syrian and other refugee crises in 
Jordan take centre stage. Our hope is that together these voices will draw a 
more nuanced picture of the Syrian presence in Jordan, highlight the positive 
contributions of Syrians in Jordan, and correct some common misconceptions.
Estimated numbers of Syrian refugees in Jordan vary. UNHCR counts 630,000 
registered refugees in Nov. 2015, while the Government of Jordan sets the 
number of Syrians in the country (whether registered refugees or not) at around 
1.5 million. The majority of the most recent influx happened in 2012-2013, and 
in spite of notable population movements back to Syria the reported numbers 
continue to slowly grow. Whatever the precise number, the presence of Syrian 
refugees in Jordan has certainly reshaped daily life, politics and economy in the 
country over the past five years.
Yet this is not the first time Jordan has witnessed a large-scale population increase 
due to conflicts in other states. In fact, the entire history of Jordan is intertwined 
with forced population movements. In the early phase of state-formation, 
Circassians, Chechens and Armenians made many important contributions to 
the country’s evolving economic and political structures. This was followed by 
massive movements from Palestine to Jordan in 1948, and from the West Bank 
to the East Bank of Jordan in 1967. As a result, 2.1 million registered Palestinian 
refugees and a large number of displaced persons currently reside in Jordan. 
Many but not all of them were given Jordanian citizenship, turning them into a 
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special population group sometimes referred to as ‘refugee-citizens’. In the 1990s 
and 2000s, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis also came to Jordan, establishing 
themselves in the country at least temporarily in order to escape the violence and 
persecution then being meted out in Iraq. All of these population influxes, as well 
as other, more minor movements, have left their marks on Jordan. 
The articulation of concern has accompanied each new wave of arrivals. Today 
it is commonplace to hear public pronouncements and media reports repeating 
refrains like “we do not have the resources to accommodate yet another group 
of people”, or “we already have the Iraqis, and the Palestinians.” This is frequently 
connected to statements suggesting that Syrians are a burden on the country’s 
economy, infrastructure, resources, and public services.
Nevertheless, various forms of support and solidarity exist in Jordan, not just 
from the international community but also from Jordanian public bodies, non-
governmental organizations, initiatives, and individuals. Many of these remain 
relatively hidden, and are only heard of and discussed among very specialized 
audiences. This book seeks to change that by bringing such alternative voices out 
into the open. It is based on the conviction that their insights not only contribute 
to a more nuanced understanding of the issues Jordan currently faces, but also 
draw a brighter picture of the Syrian presence in Jordan.
This book assembles five such voices, each of which sheds light on different 
aspects of the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. Daoud Kuttab, the founder of 
AmmanNet / Radio Al-Balad, discusses common anti-Syrian media discourses 
and their background. He also highlights attempts to counter them, for example 
the establishment of joint Jordanian-Syrian teams of journalists. Yusuf Mansur, 
Deputy Chief Commissioner of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority, 
then provides us with an alternative perspective on the economic contribution 
of refugees in Jordan. He emphasizes the positive contribution that these 
population influxes have left on the Jordanian political economy in the past, and 
the immense benefits Jordan could gain by integrating Syrian refugees properly. 
Subsequently, three members of the Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU) provide 
us with in-depth insights into the situation of Syrian women in Jordan, and the 
organization’s attempts to strengthen solidarity between women (and men) in 
the country, no matter their citizenship or origins. After that, Wael Qaddour, a 
Syrian playwright and theatre director now based in Jordan, speaks about the 
experience of being a Syrian intellectual in exile. He questions the refugee frame 
and the way it cements an image of Syrians in Jordan as victims, arguing that 
this results in the restriction of Syrians’ ability to move and pursue independent 
livelihood strategies. Finally, Matar Saqer, former spokesperson of UNRWA, 
reflects on the comparison between Syrian and Palestinian refugees often found 
in public discourse. While he finds certain areas of overlap, he insists on the 
crucial differences that characterize both refugee experiences. 
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The interviews assembled here represent five individual perspectives on the 
effects of forced migration on Jordan. Their purpose is to start a conversation. 
We know there are many other voices out there that could further contribute 
to a more nuanced discussion about the Syrian presence. We hope the ones 
assembled here will inspire others to speak up as well, and that together they can 
rethink the Syrian refugee crisis and imagine a future for Jordan in which Syrians 
no longer need to live in the shadows. 
Dr. Katharina Lenner and Bashar Al-Khatib
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‘A bad symphony’ – Media 
discourses on Syrian 
refugees in Jordan
Interview with Daoud Kuttab, AmmanNet / Radio Al-Balad, 30.7.2015
Daoud Kuttab is the founder and director of AmmanNet / Radio Al-Balad (est. 
2000/2007), a Jordanian news website and community radio station that strives 
to provide independent coverage of issues throughout the Kingdom and the 
surrounding region. Since the beginning of the Syria crisis, AmmanNet / Radio Al-
Balad has sought to challenge mainstream discourses in the media about Syrian 
refugees and to amplify the voices and perspectives of Syrians in Jordan. 
Please tell us about your professional and personal relationships with the 
Syrian conflict, and specifically with the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. 
We run a media organisation that is not commercial but community-based, so 
we are interested in the public issues that connect society in Jordan. We use 
the media to raise awareness, to do more research, and to point out what is 
happening in this area. As part of our work we always pay attention to the weaker 
elements of society, e.g. poor, women, young people, or persons with disabilities. 
This is because we feel that they are voiceless people who are often ignored by 
the mainstream media. The Syrian crisis and the ensuing refugee flow into Jordan 
naturally fit within our interest of paying attention to voiceless people who really 
have no access to the media and to the keys of power in this country.
The issue became more acute for us through our programme ‘Eye on the Media’, 
which monitors various media in Jordan. We discovered a very worrisome trend: 
there is a lot of hate speech regarding Syrians in the media, especially some of 
the morning radio shows, in which anything that happens in Jordan is always 
blamed on the Syrians. People are not working: “it is the Syrians’ fault”. People are 
depressed: “it is the Syrians’ fault”. They are an easy target, because they have 
nobody to defend them. As a result of this, we started thinking that we should 
do something about the Syrian situation. In our ethos, in our value system, we 
try not to preach. We do not want to tell people what the story is from on high. 
We want to come from the bottom. We want the Syrian people themselves to 
tell their story. We therefore designed a radio programme co-produced by Syrian 
journalists, who we trained, and some Jordanians. Our goal was to legitimise the 
Syrians. We did not want this to be just a side programme by the Syrians, ‘here 
we are, we did our job’. No. We wanted the Syrians to feel part of this project, and 
we also wanted Jordanian officials to take the Syria programme seriously. So we 
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often had a Syrian and a Jordanian working together as co-anchors, so that when 
they called an official they could not be so easily dismissed. They had to be taken 
more seriously. This was a programme that went on for more than two years. It 
stopped now because we ran out of money, but we hope to re-start it soon. 
Alongside the media training and the radio programme, we also produced some 
video reports talking about the Syrian crisis. To be honest, we were surprised 
by how little information is available to the public. We wanted to make sure 
that as many Syrians as possible listened to the programme, so we contracted 
radio stations in Irbid, Zarqa, Karak and Ma’an1 to re-broadcast the programme. 
Eighty percent of the Syrians in Jordan live outside the refugee camps, so it is 
not just people in Za’atari and the other camps that we have to reach. We are 
still very close to the Syrian journalists that we trained. Many of them are now 
working in different jobs, so we feel good about the fact that they received some 
employment. And many people depended on our bulletin, so we are trying to 
restart it as soon as possible. 
You said you trained Syrians as journalists. How did that work in terms of 
work permits?2 
We do not apply for work permits. We give them money as an honorarium or 
stipend, or to cover expenses, but not as a salary. So they do not apply for a job, 
and we do not need work permits for them. That way, we do not get into the 
legal issues. We are supposed to get permission from the government for these 
projects, but we do not apply for anything. We are a bit of a rebellious core group 
here. 
What other projects have you been working on? 
The second project we did, which I think has had good effects, was a series 
of investigative reports about the Syrians in Jordan. The first one dealt with 
zawaj barrani, or marriage outside the contract system.3 We conducted in-depth 
research and discovered that a lot of marriages take place totally illegally and 
without any documentation on even a small piece of paper. Most of the cases are 
Syrian women with Arab, often Saudi husbands. Many times these marriages end 
in a strange way; the husband just disappears because he has no legal obligation. 
One of the problems was that no representative of the Islamic Sharia courts 
was accessible to refugees, even in Za’atari camp. So even if they wanted to 
1 Irbid, Zarqa, Karak and Ma’an are four of the twelve governorates in Jordan. Irbid and Zarqa are located in Jordan’s densely populated 
northwest, which hosts the majority of Syrian refugees. Karak and Ma’an are located in the less populated south of the country, which also 
hosts fewer refugees.  
2 Few Syrians have been able to obtain work permits in Jordan. According to current estimates, only 10% of Syrians de facto working in Jordan 
have work permits. It is too costly or difficult for the large part to follow through with the process. 
3 Alice Su: ‘Investigative Report: Syrian refugees subject to undocumented illegal marriages’, 24.9.2013 (http://ar.ammannet.net/news/211645). 
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register their marriage they could not do it, as they are not allowed to leave the 
camp. You also have to prove that you were not married before, which means 
you must go to the Syrian embassy and update your documents. Maybe you do 
not even have the documents. So there were a lot of details that we discovered 
were part of the problem. I am happy to say that after we did the research and 
published the report, the Jordanian Ministry of Awqaf (Endowments and Islamic 
Affairs) appointed someone in Za’atari camp as part of a regular office there. So 
at least those who are interested in documenting these marriages now have the 
opportunity to do that. 
The second investigation we did was about corruption and the selling of documents 
to Syrians.4 People were not allowed to travel unless they had a document: some 
kind of proof that they had a job, or a permit to live in Jordan. We discovered many 
cases of bribery. In fact, one of our reporters posed as a Syrian, and he paid 17 
JDs to get a document stating that he was a Syrian refugee. Within a week he 
had a document with his name; and he is a Jordanian citizen. This shows how 
corrupt the system is. We were told that many officials were arrested after we 
published that story. Of course, some in the government were not happy, and 
they are now trying to raise a case against the reporter on the grounds that it was 
illegal to try to get documents in the wrong way. 
The last investigation we did regarded the deportation of Syrians back to Syria.5 
That was also very problematic because the government refused to talk to us 
about this, and we had to take advantage of a press conference with the prime 
minister to ask him our questions. He answered in a very vague way. We are now 
also in a legal case against the minister of interior because he refused to answer 
any of our questions, in violation of the law of access to information. 
Maybe we could go a bit deeper into how you perceive the general 
discourse on Syrian refugees in Jordan’s media and beyond. You 
mentioned hate speech. Could you go into some more detail regarding 
what you perceive as the main components of this? When Syrian refugees 
are discussed, what are the issues and aspects that come up?
There are three issues that are often repeated about the Syrian refugee crisis. 
Number one is that they are taking the jobs of the Jordanians. This is the most 
repeated statement, and it is largely not true. In fact they have provided jobs for 
the Jordanians. If they have taken jobs from anybody then it is the Egyptians 
that have suffered, not the Jordanians. So we think this is a false accusation 
4 Hazem Al-Mazuni / Hanan Khandaji: ‘Confiscated Syrian ID Papers and the Emergence of a Black Market in Jordan’, 9.9.2014 (http://
ar.ammannet.net/news/237023).  
5 Hazim al-Hamwi / Musab Shawabkeh: ‘Jordan puts the lives of Syrian refugees at risk by forcibly returning them to their country’, 15.6.2015 
(http://ar.ammannet.net/news/251221).  
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that does not really make much sense. The second accusation is that they raise 
the prices of rent, especially in Mafraq and Irbid.6 This was probably true in the 
beginning, but you know that when prices go up someone also benefits. So it is 
also Jordanian owners who have benefitted. It is true that some newly married 
couples have had to pay more for rent because of this, but it is not a case in 
which all Jordanians pay the price. Unfortunately, it is only some of the poor. In 
the last year, according to research done by CARE,7 the rent prices have gone 
down! This is a surprise, I was surprised too. There are two reasons for why they 
have gone down: the rate of new arrivals has slowed down considerably over the 
past year, and the housing boom has continued. So there are more houses, but 
not more people. Supply and demand, the formula for any economics: there are 
more apartments and not as many people, so the price is going down. I checked 
with the mayor of Mafraq, who I met at a conference, and he said it is true that 
the prices have gone down.
The third accusation is that they cause traffic jams [everyone laughs]. These are 
the three big stories that everybody mentions: “oh, they cause traffic jams”. I 
think this accusation is very petty. I tell people to go to Damascus, Baghdad or 
Cairo – that’s a traffic jam. Here a traffic jam takes something like ten minutes. 
In Cairo, it takes you two hours to get from one side of the city to the other side. 
This is not a traffic jam. 
The other issue that is totally not talked about, including by the government, 
is that Jordan has benefitted from the refugees. Everyone says that Jordan is 
paying a price, but Jordan has actually benefitted. The economy improved with 
the refugees. The country has had an annual GDP growth rate of 2-3% since 2011. 
There is more money. If you have a million more people in a country that buy 
food, telephone cards, transport, and so on, then of course the country is going 
to benefit. Where is the loss? Water? People are paying for the water. Electricity? 
They are paying for the electricity. Somebody is paying for it – the UN or someone 
else. So I do not understand. The Syrians are also very entrepreneurial; they are 
starting a lot of new factories, companies, and restaurants. They are creating 
a better economy. I know that the common argument is that Jordan is paying 
a price for the Syrians, but if you talk to an economist like Yusuf Mansour and 
others, you will learn that Jordan has benefitted a lot from the Syrians.8 
6 Mafraq and Irbid are two governorates in the north of Jordan, where the majority of refugees living in urban host communities (rather than 
refugee camps) are located. 
7 See CARE (2015): ‘Five years into exile. The challenges faced by Syrian refugees outside camps in Jordan and how they and their host 
communities are coping.’ (http://www.care.at/images//Downloads/Publikationen/FiveYearsIntoExile.pdf).
8 See interview with Yusuf Mansour, this volume. 
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I have been at conferences where they have talked about the fact that the lack of 
work permits has forced many investors from Syria to move to Egypt. Even the 
mayors of Mafraq and Za’atari are saying, ‘please help the Syrians stay in Jordan 
and let the people work, because it benefits our community’. It is becoming more 
and more clear that the Syrians will be here for a long time. The attention is now 
shifting from only humanitarian concerns to other things like work and mid- to 
long-term planning. The mayors, for example, are saying that we should not lose 
the Syrian investors. Some of the Syrians come with their factories, with their 
money, and they want to hire their own people because they know how to run 
these enterprises. They are also probably cheaper. So the mayors are saying that 
if we do not facilitate this for them, then they will move to Egypt.
We try to use some of these arguments in our reports. The Jordanian government 
argues otherwise and maintains that Syrians are a burden in order to raise funds. 
Fine. But if you want to be honest, they have not cost the country. Ok, maybe 
the infrastructure, but as I said: the UN and others have been paying the price for 
everything. So I think these are the three issues, as I told you, and they are mostly 
false accusations. Unfortunately, what happens whenever some crime or theft 
happens, or some political problem comes to light, then the demagogues always 
accuse the weak link, whoever that is. When the Iraqis came here, they brought a 
lot of money, literally cash money. But unfortunately most of the Syrians are poor. 
So it is easy to attack the Syrians. The Iraqis all applied for Jordanian passports, 
and the Jordanians sort of liked the Iraqis. The Syrians are not as rich, but as I said, 
the country has benefitted from their presence. 
Thinking back on the discourse about Iraqis at the time, there was similar 
talk then about increasing rent prices.
Yes, that the rents were going up. But the Iraqis bought a lot of property. Most 
of the Iraqis also transited: they came to Jordan but went quickly. They stayed a 
little bit and then ended up in Australia, Canada, etc. Syrians are larger in number 
and not as fortunate. The Syrians have not bought property, they mostly rent it. 
They don’t have the money or contacts. So I think the issue is a bit more acute. 
Does the way in which the Syrian refugees are addressed in the media 
remind you of previous refugee crises, or the talk about other refugee 
groups in Jordan?
The (semi-)private morning radio shows did not really exist during the Iraqi 
refugee crisis. The radio was not as much of a media instrument. Most of the 
radio stations were government-controlled, and they did not usually go into this. 
There is a lot of competition now, and they speak this way to get an audience. 
So at least on the media side I did not hear as much. Maybe people talked about 
it privately, but the media was not an instrument for hate speech in the way it is 
now. 
‘A bad symphony’ – Media discourses on Syrian refugees in Jordan
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In the beginning, people welcomed the Syrian refugees as guests. Do you 
believe the change in attitude resulted from peoples’ own frustrations, 
from the media machine, or from other political or social powers in the 
country? Or is it a combination of all this? 
People really thought this was going to be temporary, and did not realise it might 
last this long. People thought it would be a few months, but the longer the 
Syrians stayed the more people turned against them. I think all of the issues you 
mentioned contributed, but I think the biggest reason is the length of stay. As 
you said, in the beginning people welcomed them but when their stay extended 
people became worried. Again, most of the people who are worried are people 
who feel that Jordan has a unique, East Bank identity. There is an East Bank 
nationalism that they don’t want to be diluted. They have never accepted that 
Jordan is a country for its citizens, not for any particular tribe. So these are the 
people who are the most opposed to the Syrians, and the Palestinians, and the 
Iraqis. They feel that some of the privileges and benefits they have as heads of 
tribes, or as part of the East Bank population, are being taken away. 
So you are talking about nationalists in the tribal social context, not in the 
political context? 
It has some political aspects. Some of the leaders of the anti-Syrian presence are 
concerned about the political purity of Jordan. In their eyes, Jordanianism is being 
weakened. Socio-politically and economically, I think most of the people who 
live in these tribal areas are benefitting from the Syrians. This is because most 
of the areas that are being developed for the Syrians are traditionally tribal areas, 
especially in the north. So I think they are benefitting from the Syrians, or at least 
their leaders are benefitting; not the regular people maybe. 
But even if you can pinpoint the social forces that are spearheading this 
anti-Syrian sentiment, the question remains: how does that get into the 
media? What are the connection points? Is this basically the morning 
shows responding to popular sentiment, or is there a deliberate attempt to 
push this? 
Based on the information I have, my analysis is that sometimes it comes from the 
intelligence services. Some elements of the intelligence services are interested 
because there is a connection between some of these tribal leaders and different 
trends within the security forces. Those trends are reflected in the security 
agencies and in some of the media outlets, like the army’s Hala Radio, or the 
police’s Amen FM, or Rotana. They all have connections with powerful people in 
the government, the army, and the intelligence service. Sometimes it looks like 
somebody pushed a button, and sometimes you ask yourself why – why today? 
What happened? You try to find out because it doesn’t feel natural. Everything 
is very normal, and all of a sudden you have an attack against Syrians. Then it 
becomes normal again, and then you have another attack. 
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So they start together? 
Yes, it seems like it is in concert. There is a bad symphony that is always playing 
on the same day. You hear it on all the stations, and then it also ends on the same 
day. 
And you believe it is directed, i.e. that there is a sort of invitation? 
I think so. I do not have the proof, so it is hard for me to make the accusation. 
But if you follow the trend, you find that there is, for example, a column of 
anonymous reports in the Al-Rai newspaper9 called Zawareeb (riddles). You can 
then find echoes of these reports in the commentary of some of these radio 
stations. So you can almost see the way it works and the tools they use – and you 
can see it going up and down. You also see the same method being used against 
the Muslim Brotherhood for example. You can see that they decided they are 
going to attack them, because all of a sudden there is a lot of stuff against them, 
then it dies, and then goes up again. 
Do you believe these spikes are connected to other events in the country, 
for example as a way of distracting the public from something else? Is 
there a specific point to this timing? 
My hunch would be yes – sometimes elections in parliament, sometimes regional 
issues. But that is just conjecture on my part. One would have to look at the dates 
and see what is happening politically to really make that claim. It would be a great 
study! 
Would you say that, beyond these media outlets, anti-Syrian discourse is 
widespread among the population? Are there parts of the population that 
do not buy into this? 
This does not happen in a total vacuum. As they say, there is no smoke without 
fire, and no fire without smoke. There are obviously some seeds that are already 
there. People in the media take advantage of this, using their voice to make the 
seeds grow larger. It is a cycle. It is like a strong seed in an environment that is 
welcoming, and it blossoms. But I do not think that it is a majority. It is something 
people say at dinner time, but I do not feel that it is overwhelming. It jars you 
when you hear it on the radio because they exaggerate.
So they are not totally making it up. If they did people would laugh at them. So 
they are clever enough to use some cases. You know, somebody was robbed by 
a Syrian, so they take this case and blow it up. They do not fabricate the story – 
there probably is a story of one person stealing something from the shop. I mean, 
hundreds of Jordanians steal but they never talk about it. But if a Syrian steals 
9 Al-Rai is a major Jordanian daily that is largely government-owned. 
‘A bad symphony’ – Media discourses on Syrian refugees in Jordan
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something from a shop, they make that into a story and build on it. It is what you 
call ‘herd mentality’ in journalism. Somebody starts the ball rolling, and then other 
journalists all start searching for stories about Syrians as thieves. 
Let us talk about the lawsuits you mentioned. The Ministry of Interior is 
trying to prosecute some journalists from AmmanNet. Can you briefly tell 
us about what has transpired? 
We applied for information, in accordance with the law, as part of our investigation 
into the deportation of Syrians. But they did not give us the information. There 
is a legal appeal process in which the information centre has 30 days to reply 
to you. Normally, they reply within 30 days and say ‘no’, and it is signed by the 
committee. This time they said ‘no’ but it was not signed, which made us think 
that maybe they could not get the majority to approve this thing. So we applied 
to the court to force the Ministry of Interior to give us information. 
In the meantime, we discovered that Waddah Al-Hmoud, the head of the Syrian 
Refugee Affairs Directorate in the Ministry of Interior, sent a letter to the ministry 
recommending that the author of the article and AmmanNet be tried, because we 
have been hurting the reputation of Jordan. He mentioned all the investigations 
I told you about, even though in all of those cases we spoke to the government, 
we had the government’s point of view, all our sources were solid, and there is 
not a single fact in there that they have questioned. But they said we are harming 
the image of Jordan. So we are waiting. I do not think it is serious. So far it is not 
moving, it is just a recommendation. I think it depends on what the court does. If 
we win the case, maybe they will do something. 
So you see it more as a form of intimidation? 
It is pressure, it is intimidation. For example, I normally drive to the West Bank 
with a special permit from the Ministry of Interior. This week, they refused to give 
me the permit. They are trying to use petty tactics to pressure us. 
Do you believe this is connected with the intimidation reportedly taking 
place towards other journalists? As you know, there have been several 
arrests. Is there something like a campaign? 
I don’t think it is a campaign, but I think the security trend has become stronger 
and the liberal trend has become weaker. The government feels that they can 
be more repressive without getting punished by the international community, 
because of the war and Jordan’s geo-political standing, so I think they think they 
can get away with more of this stuff. 
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Do these forms of investigation effectively hinder the work of the 
investigative teams? 
Our team is very strong. It does not affect us. I support them, and we expect 
things like this. In fact, when this happens it actually makes us feel good – we are 
getting under their skin. If they are upset with us then that means we are doing 
good work. I do not think we are afraid because of that, no. 
But is this a factor for other journalists? 
For some journalists this is surely the case. I am sure for many journalists it has a 
huge effect. But we are totally independent: economically independent, politically 
independent. They really cannot stop us, but we are worried that they might use legal 
and other types of pressure against us in the future. We had our license renewed 
by the Department of Press and Publications last April. We were worried that they 
might not, but they renewed it, so thank God. We have had a license for the radio 
for five years now, but at times I have worried that they would create obstacles. 
Outside of AmmanNet, do you see other attempts – similar or different – 
to counter the prevailing discourse about the Syrian refugee crisis? 
There are a lot of people working on the level of NGOs and in other media. There 
are also some courageous members of parliament. We are not the only ones. 
I think 7iber10 does good work, as does Ru’ya11, sometimes Al-Ghad12 and the 
Identity Center13. There are some good people there, and I am sure you can find 
a couple of other good initiatives. 
Do you believe that the way to counter this discourse is through such a 
combination of NGOs, media and parliamentarians? Or should it be taken 
to other levels, either upwards or downwards? 
I think it is politically very hard to affect, because Jordan is immune to pressure 
on this issue. They are seen as the power in this region that is helping the Syrians. 
But I think this hate speech is a topic that can even be discussed with the queen. 
She would be interested in this issue. I know we talked to the Jordan Media 
Institute (headed by Princess Reem), and they are interested in it, but I have 
not seen them do a lot of research on it. In general, I think that a combination is 
probably the best way. But we also talk to the EU and to other embassies about 
it; we translate some of our investigations into English and distribute them. 
10 7iber (www.7iber.com) is an independent Jordanian online magazine that seeks to promote critical and open conversation about politics, 
economy, culture and society in the region. 
11 Ru’ya TV (www.roya.tv) is a Jordanian TV station that specifically targets young people in Jordan with critical coverage and discussions of 
local affairs. 
12 Al-Ghad (www.al-ghad.com) is a major Jordanian daily that is deemed relatively independent. 
13 The Identity Center (www.identity-center.org), run by Mohammed Husseini, is an independent civil society organisation that works to 
empower people in Jordan and the region to participate in political, economic and social development and, ultimately, to shape and control 
their identities and destinies. 
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Yusuf Mansur is the deputy chief commissioner of the Aqaba Special Economic 
Zone Authority. An economist by training, Mansur worked as a consultant for 
a variety of governmental and donor agencies and contributed regular columns 
to the Jordan Times, Jordan’s English-language daily newspaper, in addition to 
the Arabic-language newspapers. He has been vocal in refuting the common 
discourse of Syrian refugees as a socio-economic burden in the last years, and 
has advocated different ways of dealing with the refugee population. 
What roles have refugees and labour migrants played in the Jordanian 
political economy over time, and how does the socio-economic impact of 
these groups on the political economy of Jordan differ? 
I have a hypothesis, which HRH Princess Basma alluded to in a speech at the 
Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford University, where she talked about how Jordan 
benefitted from refugees throughout the ages.1 My hypothesis, as an economist 
trained in the ideas of Joseph Schumpeter, is that it is important for a capitalist 
system to have creative destruction. This simply means that organisations decline 
and newer ones emerge, which can do things bigger and/or better. I work for you, 
learn your trade, then I become your competitor, and as such I may win the battle: 
your company goes down and I jump up one place in the pecking order. With this 
creative destruction, you can see layer upon layer of growth and innovation. This 
is how commerce, trade, and industry expand and economies thrive.
My hypothesis is that refugees bring with them intellectual capital and sometimes 
financial capital. The Iraqi refugees injected a significant amount of investment 
into the economy. They did not compete with local businessmen but expanded 
opportunities for local and foreign investors. Their money was not made in Jordan, 
and their intellect was not trained and created in Jordan. It was an intellectual gift 
to Jordan to have all these matured Iraqi artists, artisans, physicians, teachers, 
economists, engineers, etc. enter the country. So this was a gift, which I call 
‘creative construction’; instead of Schumpeter’s creative destruction. It does not 
1 Princess Basma’s lecture, the annual Harrell-Bond lecture, dated 5 Nov 2014, can be downloaded as a podcast at: http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/
events/harrellbond2014 
22
Alternative Voices on the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan: An Interview Collection
mean – at least in the first instance – the destruction of what is, but an addition 
to the fruits of the creative destruction process. Through this process comes 
new technology and know-how from somewhere else. I coined the term creative 
construction in reference to what refugees bring with them – whether it is labour, 
capital, innovations (better ways of doing things), or new creative ideas.
Refugees also come as consumers, increasing the overall level of demand in a 
country. Markets that are larger usually fare better than smaller markets, given 
that all else is the same. Short term adjustments may be painful initially, not only 
to the refugees but also to their hosts. Depending on the size of the country and 
the size of the refugee population, prices will surely increase in the short term 
to meet the rapid rise in demand. But, in the end, markets adjust. Factories start 
churning and making new products. Thus, the existence of refugees creates an 
increase in supply, which means greater job opportunities for the refugees and 
their host, and the economy expands. 
This is also evidenced by the earlier migration history of Jordan, where you 
can see these acts of creative constuction. Historically, today’s Jordan was 
not an independent state but an area east of the river Jordan, and traditionally 
the people living here were either farmers or tribesmen that roamed the land 
freely. The farmers were concentrated around water sources. Hence the farming 
community was not huge. The land was relatively lawless until 1880, when the 
Circassians refugees came. They were warriors brought by the Ottomans to help 
the empire lay the law. This act made it possible to collect taxes on a broader 
scale. The migrants were also traders and craftsmen, who built the first modern 
roads in the country to commute and conduct their affairs.
The Circassians were followed by the Chechens in 1902, and they too were 
farmers, artisans, and craftspeople. They were the blacksmiths, carpenters etc. 
They were willing to settle the land and actually produced four cities: Zarqa, 
Azraq, Sweileh, and Sukhneh. Their intellectual capital, innovations and hard work 
paid off as the country was able to reap many benefits that would have otherwise 
taken years to accumulate. So in the very early stages there were these bursts 
of civility, civilisation, law-abiding structures and semi-formal policing. The country 
started to form an identity and a resident population of refugees were settled and 
gained equal rights. 
Then came the Armenians, who were escaping the Turks. They came down to 
Aleppo, and from there some went to Palestine and some went south to Jordan. 
They too were the cobblers, the jewellery makers, the photographers, etc. 
So you had these craftspeople, who maybe had very little in terms of worldly 
possessions because they were forcibly displaced, but they brought with them 
their brain power and a willingness to work. The upshot is that they too boosted 
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the economy. My hypothesis is that if people do come into your country and 
you quickly accept them, and they become part of the system – full producers 
and consumers – then you are likely to benefit from them on the production 
side (supply) and consumption side (demand). In other words, the economy will 
greatly expand as productivity and products increase.
After the above-mentioned migrant populations started to settle in today’s Jordan, 
we had the Palestinian influx which started in the 1920s. Several Palestinian and 
Syrian families came then to Jordan and started production. There were two 
prominent Palestinian families in Amman, Mango and Asfour, and there were 
important Syrian families, e.g. Tabbaa and Bdeir. The head of the Bdeir family 
was the one who lit up Amman. He bought a generator from Syria or Lebanon, 
brought it here and started lighting up the streets. He thus started what became 
the national electric grid. By then the state was forming – the Emirate of 
Transjordan was declared in 1921. King Abdullah I needed administrators, and 
he was given gifts of creative construction. The first prime minister of Jordan 
was a Lebanese – Rasheed Tlei’ – and many of his administrators came from the 
educated Palestinian population across the Jordan River. His administration, staff 
and cabinet were formed from those and others, as he needed people who could 
read, write, and speak different languages. So, again, you have another influx or 
infusion of human and physical capital, labour and consumers. The data shows 
that the economy grew in leaps and bounds as a result. 
The largest group of refugees that has come to Jordan over the decades 
has been Palestinians, in 1948, 1967, plus the so-called “returnees” of 
1990/1. What has been their contribution to the political economy of the 
country?
If you track the figures and the data, you will see bumps in the GDP. The biggest 
jumps in the modern history of Jordan came immediately after 1948 due to the 
largest influx of people in relation to the population: the forced displacement 
of Palestinians. If you look at the year after 1948, the economy went up by 
something like 40%. This was because the population almost doubled and people 
brought not only some of their belongings with them but also what they could 
muster in savings, and of course their skills and talents. They needed housing, 
food, restaurants, etc., so they began to make these. They brought with them 
their trades and learning, and they invested these in the country as they became 
citizens and co-founders of the modern Jordanian state. What Jordan did right 
was to give them citizenship, allowing people to live as full-fledged citizens. In 
Europe, in comparison, you could see that certain countries were not so friendly 
towards immigrants. They were at first, and their economies boomed. But when 
they became hostile to migrants, following a strategy of segregation and exclusion 
from normalcy and the benefits of being citizens in a developed economy, they 
only hurt themselves in the long term. On the other hand, a nation that took in 
refugees tended to flourish. A clear example of that is the US. 
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The year 1967 brought in more Palestinians, and yes, there was a boom after 
that. We did lose the revenue from tourism for several years2 and the country 
became destabilised, but afterwards it re-stabilised and kept surging ahead. In 
1990/91, we received the repatriated Jordanians from Kuwait. The numbers are 
still iffy. Public statements used to speak of about half a million people. In review, 
the number may have been closer to about 300,000. They too brought with them 
savings, compensations from the UN, their families, and human capital etc. They 
needed housing, so there was a housing boom; land and real estate prices jolted 
upward. They brought with them new demand because they were big spenders, 
and they had been large earners in relation to the size of the Jordanian economy. 
They were also the best-trained work force that we had, as the Gulf had attracted 
(and continues to attract) the best and brightest from Jordan. So when they came 
to Jordan, they gave us this once lost gift of intellectual capital. Their savings were 
also invested in Jordan, and again there was a huge spike in 1992. The GDP went 
up by 16% in real terms as a result. This helped boost the economy for a couple 
of years. Unfortunately, the economy itself was not ready. Bureaucracy and the 
business environment had not adjusted to make sustainable the gains from this 
new boost to the economy. The dynamics were not in place to accommodate 
large investments and the majority of investment went into the real estate 
market. What does an immigrant who lost his home want to do first? Build a 
new home. So real estate became the mainstay of economic growth in Jordan 
throughout the years. If you were a landlord or inherited large tracts of land, and 
if you managed to not sell them, you would have become extremely rich over the 
years. 
How about the Iraqi refugees? 
In the 1990s, we received the Shiite refugees escaping the persecution of 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq. They did not have much of an impact as their numbers 
were few, but again they helped grow the economy. We benefitted from them 
in the creation of private universities. I believe that private universities would 
not have emerged had there not been Iraqi teachers willing to work for under 
$1,000 per month even though they were trained in some of the best Western 
universities. So we had first-rate researchers, scholars, doctors, physicians, etc. 
that worked for lower wages and filled a gap. They were a bonus in terms of 
human capital. Some worked informally because the government would not give 
them work permits. Iraqi artists, whose paintings now sell in the thousands if not 
hundreds of thousands, would sell their paintings initially for $50 just to put food 
on the table; such paintings and works are worth a thousand times that if not 
more. So yes, we benefitted!
2 This was due to the fact that the West Bank and Jerusalem, important tourist hubs, were occupied by Israel in 1967. 
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Then we go on to 20033, when we started receiving the wealthy Iraqis – the ones 
who made it during the Saddam era. Some came with money and some started 
to produce in the country as they opened factories. Between 2004 and 2008 
you had what I call the golden years: five years where we averaged a GDP per 
capita growth rate of close to 8% in real terms. An enviable growth – but again, 
the growth was mainly in real estate. This time the investment went mainly into 
real estate, not just because some refugees were looking for homes to host their 
families but also because they constructed offices, office buildings, and things 
like that. They invested their money in real estate, which in our part of the world 
is the safest form of investment. In a third world economy you always look for 
real estate, because you own that property and the laws on that are not likely to 
change very quickly; thus real estate is viewed as a safe haven. 
Did the ways in which Jordan’s rulers received refugees change over time? 
If yes, how so? 
In the past, we managed to take in refugees in a highly beneficial manner. Before 
the modern state of Jordan, before the 1950s, people were integrated quickly 
and hence went on to make a people. After the population expanded and became 
educated or conversant in modern systems of work and governance, there 
emerged a form of relative discrimination against newcomers. The newcomers 
were constantly viewed as competitors and were consequently excluded, or 
found it more and more difficult to participate as fully as they did in the past. I am 
not saying that everybody thought this, but overall, refugees were perceived as 
competiors who came to share in the pie.
But they were also a gift to the government, since the government was able 
to receive tons of aid because it was a recipient of these refugees. It was 
advantageous, as it has been in many other countries, to portray the refugees as 
helpless, poor, and dependent; and as consumers rather than possible producers. 
Hence, some were kept in refugee camps and could never become full producers 
or perceived competitors. So it was a self-fulfilling prophecy: the refugees were 
needy, hence they became such, and the country benefited less from their influx. 
But they became a source of external revenue for the state as they imposed 
some pressure on the infrastructure. The state welcomed these revenues, 
because they enabled it to pay rent to the people of the country, or to those that 
it employed in an ever burgeoning bureaucracy. 
How have the Syrian refugees been received? 
We started receiving Syrian refugees in 2011/12, and we saw a pattern repeating 
itself. We saw a similar attitude to that expressed toward some of the Iraqi 
3 In 2003, the US-led invasion of Iraq toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. 
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refugees after 2003. In the golden years, 2004-2008, the cost of hosting the 
refugees was somewhat exaggerated, in my view. Talk was of about half a million 
Iraqi refugees, when in fact, with some little investigation, one would find out that 
the number was closer to 170,000 – yet this number emerged only years later 
and not from official sources. Many of the refugees also ended up not staying 
because of the exclusion they faced from full participation in the host country. 
I saw a similar pattern emerging with the Syrian refugees. People would say 
‘the refugees are the cause of the inflation.’ But let us put this in context. Jordan 
imports 96% of its energy, and 87% of its caloric intake. So 87% of the food you 
consume here is imported. This means that when you have more people, when 
refugees come in, you just buy larger shipments. When you buy larger shipments 
you receive greater discounts. So actually they should have brought the prices 
down, not increased them. You could buy a ship that carries 60,000 tons of sugar 
at 30% less than if you had bought 30,000 tons. So your discounts are greater, 
and there is no justification for prices going up, except for monopolistic and 
rentier behaviour. So refugees should have been beneficial in terms of lowering 
food prices. 
At the same time, the refugees started coming into Jordan when it was facing 
the dilemma of losing its gas supply from Egypt. The gas pipeline was being cut 
off constantly because of trouble in Egypt that was related to the Arab Spring. The 
government wanted alternatives, so it had to import more fuel from elsewhere 
to make up for the loss of the Egyptian gas supply. By now, overall fuel imports 
make up about 20-25% of GDP. The government wanted to increase energy 
prices due to the prescriptions of the IMF,4 and increase taxes. 
The Syrian refugees were a handy excuse for everything that went bad. Some 
would scream, ‘How can we feed them?’ Well, you import more food. ‘They are 
killing our water supply’ – they actually live as squatters, and in refugee camps, 
so they do not have showers and flushing toilets, and consequently use very little 
water. You can see this when you go to Za’atari camp.5 ‘They are getting water 
for free’ – this is bogus. They are not getting water for free. UNICEF6 buys them 
the water, WFP7 buys them food coupons, another donor agency provides them 
4 Jordan has been undergoing a second round of IMF-mandated structural adjustment since 2012, which has included many sensitive and 
controversial public spending cuts. The first round took place from 1989 to 2004. 
5 Za’atari camp was established in July 2012 in Mafraq governorate and is the largest refugee camp for Syrians in Jordan. It currently hosts 
around 83,000 refugees. 
6 The UN Children’s Rights and Emergency Relief Organisation (UNICEF) is a United Nations programme that provides long-term humanitarian 
and developmental assistance to children and mothers in developing countries. 
7 The World Food Programme (WFP) is the food assistance branch of the United Nations and the world’s largest humanitarian organisation 
addressing hunger and promoting food security. 
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with gas cylinders. UNHCR8 provides the tents – so each UN agency is providing 
them with something. 
The private sector, which is largely a rentier private sector, also blamed the 
refugees. Higher energy prices meant their costs were higher, and they were 
becoming less price-competitive world-wide. They too blamed the Syrians, 
although some did blame the government.
What other charges regarding the socio-economic effects of the Syrian 
presence do you make out, and how would you counter them? 
You know, I was on TV once, and a teacher came up and said: ‘our schools are 
taking on double the number of students because of the Syrians.’ The claim 
was simply wrong. Irbid and Mafraq, the highest recipients of refugees, saw an 
increase in the student population by 11% – that means two more students in a 
class of twenty. That is hardly double, but that is on average. 
The larger problem is that the Syrians in Jordan have had a fragmented impact 
in certain areas where the infrastructure was already very weak, or non-existent. 
Some schools only have ten students; some are nothing more than a rented 
room. This is because according to the education law, if there are ten students or 
more in a village or population centre, then you have to open a school. Instead of 
bussing students into one school from different communities and creating a large 
school where you enjoy economies of scale, we think we are so rich that we can 
build a school for ten students, and with that you have to have an administrator, 
a principal, a janitor, a building, etc. So they started renting and the Ministry of 
Education does not have ample funds for the required maintenance. 
The government was asking for money, it could not increase the aid received 
significantly unless it raised the infrastructure issue. In other words, because of 
the refugees, we said we needed to upgrade the infrastructure of Jordan. But 
that is only a valid claim if we do keep the refugees for the long haul, and they 
become citizens. 
The refugees were also blamed for unemployment. But they actually created 
jobs. The myth, which is known in economics as the zero-sum fallacy, is that when 
refugees come all they do is compete for jobs. But they actually create demand 
and improve productivity, and thus create more jobs for the host population. 
The common discourse at the moment is that Syrians are crowding out Jordanians 
from specific sectors. 
8 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is a United Nations agency mandated to protect and support refugees at the request of a 
government or the UN itself. It also assists in their voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country.
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Yes, let’s talk about employment and unemployment first, and then deal with this 
charge. We have a Gulf that pays seven times your salary in Jordan. There are 
about 260,000 to 270,000 Jordanians working in the Gulf, or about 14% of the 
labour force. These are the best ones, the crème de la crème. They remit about 
10% of the GDP per year, so they help boost the foreign reserves and support 
the balance of payments. Workers in the Gulf are as important as tourism. They 
take their families with them, so there are about 600,000 Jordanians – about 10% 
of the population – living overseas. This reduces stress on the state. We have 
a government that employs somewhere between 42% and 45% of the labour 
force. If you add pensioners to it, then you have about 60% of the Jordanian 
labour force receiving salaries from the government. So this labour market is 
distorted, because even if I do not work, as long as one of my family members is 
working in the Gulf he or she will pay the bills. If I do not work, it is because I am 
waiting for a government job. And when I go and work for the government I do 
not do any work, because I am the son of so-and-so. 
So, as for crowding Jordanians out of the labour market: we have this distorted 
market. Until 1976 the unemployment rate was under 2%. After that it kept rising 
by about 1% each year. And then in the last three decades, we got used to 
unemployment rates of above 10%. When I was a child, the maid was Jordanian, 
so was the car washer, the waiter – all these jobs were occupied by Jordanians. 
There was no ‘culture of shame’. 
Now to the question: Do new immigrants crowd out the Jordanian workers? The 
answer is: not really. Three years ago, I read that the Department of Statistics, the 
official source of all information in Jordan, stated that only 5% of Jordanians are 
willing to accept menial work. This is why we have between 600,000 and 800,000 
Egyptian workers; 70% of them have a legal status, the rest are working illegally. 
These workers became informally integrated into the system. If you wanted to 
get your car washed, guest workers would wash your car. If you wanted to farm, 
you would hire a guest worker. It was the same if you wanted a baker, a waiter, 
or anything that a Jordanian was ‘too proud’ to do. I put this in quotes because 
in the past we were not so proud. We only became proud because there is no 
urgency to find work. If I wait among the unemployed, my brother or cousin in 
the Gulf will pay my livelihood. I will wait for the government post, whereby I sit 
behind the desk and make a decent salary. 
When the Syrians came, they competed with the Egyptians, not with the 
Jordanian workers. They of course work in the informal sector, because we do 
not give them work permits. 
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And this is in construction or agriculture? 
This is in any job that an Egyptian would do. We are talking about refugees 
who have nothing, who want to work and feed the family. Some already sold 
their jewellery. When I did interviews in Mafraq, an area heavily populated with 
refugees, I was told that the Syrians would work at night so they would not be 
caught. Imagine, by excluding the refugees from work, they were working the 
graveyard shifts and were taking something like five Jordanian dinars per shift. 
Guess who was jealous of them? It was not the Jordanian workers who reported 
them to the police but the Egyptian workers, because they saw Syrians as direct 
competitors. 
Is there any field where you think there has actually been a negative 
impact? 
The only truly negative impact that you could talk about is water, as Jordan is the 
third poorest country in the world in terms of water consumption. But Jordan’s 
water scarcity is hardly the fault of Syrian refugees alone. For the past 30-odd 
years, we have been talking about the Red-Dead Canal. We had been talking 
about the Disi aquifer since 1977, and we only implemented it just recently. It 
became operational around three years ago. The Syrians’ consumption of water 
is disproportionately low, because they do not live under conditions similar to 
Jordanians. They are not taking three showers a day. Their consumption of water 
is one-sixth that of a Jordanian, and the same goes for electricity. 
So apparently the negative socio-economic impacts from the Syrian 
refugee crisis on Jordan have been quite limited. 
Indeed. Now, we should also have benefitted in terms of Arab inward tourism. 
There were less Jordanians that were going to spend money in Syria, so they 
were looking for Jordanian tourist sites. We should also have benefitted from 
the fact that Gulf tourists could not go by car to Syria to spend their vacation. 
They used to go to Jordan, stay one night, and then head to Syria the next day 
refreshed, and spend the rest of their vacation in Syria or Lebanon. With Lebanon 
being blocked by Israel in the south and Syria from everywhere else but the 
sea, Lebanon was beyond reach to the Gulf tourists – which make up 80% of 
our tourists! So Lebanon was semi-closed, and it suffered some turmoil. If you 
remember, they abducted one or two Gulf citizens, and the incidents pretty much 
killed the tourism season there. Syria was out of the question; Egypt as well. 
So the countries that were our traditional competitors were completely closed. 
Tourism in Jordan should have picked up, yet it didn’t.
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What role does the presence of a large number of humanitarian UN and 
other aid agencies have in terms of the country’s political economy? 
The UN organisations are one culprit in this whole game that I have not mentioned 
yet. People forget that the UN and aid agencies tend to work in terms of crisis. 
Crisis to them is business. The more refugees there are, the more money they 
make from donors, and because they take a percentage for administration, the 
more people they hire, the more prestige this or that UN bureaucrat gains. If 
refugees were given work permits, then they would be capable of providing for 
themselves, and they would not need UN agencies to provide them with aid. But 
if they are not given these work permits, then they will be completely dependent 
on aid. More aid means more work for the aid agencies. They go about saying 
how dastardly the situation is, how bad things are. They too become conspirators, 
in that they exaggerate the size of the dependence so that they can control more 
flows and take their cut of a bigger pie. One agency takes about 14% of the aid 
for administration, so it can hire consultants and this and that. Its prestige grows, 
their bureaucrats are suddenly in the press, and the UN headquarters looks at 
them and contacts them. They have been in oblivion for the past ten years, but 
now their future is more secure the more crises there are. 
That is true. They were thinking about shutting down UNHCR. 
Yes, and now it blossoms. The Iraqi crisis re-made the UN. Had they not sided 
with Bush in the Iraq conflict, things would have been very different. But this 
way aid from the US flowed, and then the refugees – so it was business. Their 
business is the misery of others. 
How about the donor countries’ role in this? USAID has studied the 
formalisation of Syrian labour in the country and the benefits of that for 
the economy and the government, and GIZ are on the same page. Do you 
see a conflict between donor countries and the UN agencies? 
Those in the business of administering aid want more money. Donors want to 
graduate out of giving money. I was called by USAID to discuss this. They were 
looking at ways and means of integrating this labour into the market. For instance, 
the Syrian workers are craftspeople – they have been producing hand-crafted 
furniture for over 4,000 years. Jordan imports furniture from either Bethlehem or 
Syria for the tourists because we do not have this craft, whereas they mastered 
it. 
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One of the big red lines regarding Syrian refugees is giving them work 
permits; how would you explain this aversion? Legally speaking it is a grey 
zone, but the question is: where does this de facto refusal come from? Is 
this more of a symbolic identity thing, or is it about economic benefits? 
Why would Jordan not provide work permits? First of all, the masses think that 
each foreigner who comes into this country takes a Jordanian’s job. It is called 
the fixity of the quantity of labour. But it is a fallacy! As I mentioned before, when 
labour comes in, they are also consumers, so they create jobs. 
Second, there is the security issue. When I was a columnist, I wrote in my 
columns: why not just give them these GPS cards or bracelets and identify them, 
and then you can view them wherever they are? They are going to work anyway, 
and this way you can benefit from the taxes they pay, in contrast to now. Plus 
they would be able to make more money because they would be formalised. 
So what would you say are the ways to get out of this vicious circle? 
Work permits – integrate them into society! Benefit for once from these horrible 
circumstances that gave you a human gift! A human being that is willing to 
work and consume in your country, and bring in his craft, knowledge, cultural 
heritage; the contribution to the creative industries, to the arts, to design – to 
everything! Syrians are really sophisticated producers and consumers. We should 
not squander this human talent, this pure gift out of others’ misery. Unfortunately, 
all of this is not even part of the discourse.
‘A human gift’ – The socio-economic dimension of the Syrian refugee crisis
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Ghada Zua’ayter – Syrian Volunteer), 10.8.2015
The Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU), headquartered in Amman, is a non-
governmental organisation committed to improving the status of women in the 
country. It is one of the most prominent and influential women’s organisations 
in the Arab world and has established strong networks with other women’s 
movements both in Jordan and around the globe. The JWU was established in 
1945, however it was forced to close when martial law was declared in 1957 
and all non-governmental organisations were dissolved. JWU re-emerged in 
1974, continuing its activities until 1981 when it was once again compelled to 
discontinue its operations. It resumed operation in 1989 when Jordan’s political 
life was liberalised and constraints on civil society were relaxed. 
How does JWU perceive the situation of women refugees in Jordan, 
especially Syrian refugees? 
The Syrian refugee influx into Jordan and the past five years of war in Syria have 
caused different and contradictory political opinions to emerge within Jordanian 
society. In the JWU we chose to distance ourselves from these opinions and 
to work with women as women regardless of their citizenship or where they 
come from, and without categorising them into different groups. If you believe in 
women’s rights then this position is absolute: it should not be limited or restricted. 
Historically, women are deprived of a lot of rights in our region, which makes 
them one of the most vulnerable groups in our society. Women’s vulnerability 
is compounded when they are refugees. They lose their homes, lands, families, 
and economic resources, not to mention the alienation and difficulty they face 
in adapting to a new society. The resulting forms of vulnerability are countless. 
Violence against Syrian women occurs on two levels: the first is the violence 
against women in general, and the second is the violence caused by the refugee 
experience, in the course of which many women lose basic skills and means of 
survival. As a result, they need various forms of service provision and training on 
women’s empowerment and income generating activities. 
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What role has JWU played during the Syria crisis so far? What are your 
main areas of intervention? 
Our normal course of action is to provide women with protection from the 
different forms of violence that they face, including armed conflict, poverty, 
economic exploitation and oppression. In addition to this we provide needed 
health, social, psychological and legal services. JWU’s hotline, for example, 
provides services for all women in Jordan regardless of the form of violence 
they face. Syrian women are part of the society and thus are included in these 
services. However, given the emergency involved and the need for quicker 
responses, our service provision to them has been more intensive than normal. 
At the beginning of the crisis we were in the field every day – both in refugee 
camps and host communities – to help with the arrival of new refugee families. 
Our most important task was reaching Syrian women upon arrival to assess their 
situation and to provide them with our health, social, psychological, and legal 
services and contacts. 
Becoming a refugee can also create a special situation for some women – so-
called ‘breadwinner women’ – wherein they become the primary earners due 
to the absence of the traditional breadwinner: the husband, the father or the 
brother. We offer vocational training programmes that teach women about 
income-generating activities they can do from their homes, where they are in a 
safe environment with their children.
The confusion around what to do with school-age Syrian children created another 
area of intervention for us. Students have generally lost their schools, books and 
academic certificates. We conducted home visits to advocate for the “back to 
school” campaigns1 and to facilitate the process of registering Syrian children 
in the Ministry of Education’s public schools. We also used existing classes in 
the 12 branches of the JWU2 to offer compensation classes for Syrian children. 
We also covered the transportation fees for Syrian girls in order to encourage 
families to send them back to school, and we are working on limiting Syrian girls’ 
early marriage. This is a very important issue for JWU. In addition, we worked on 
providing services for people with disabilities.
In host communities, we often intervene as mediators for Syrians registered 
with us, applying conflict resolution mechanisms in order to ease tensions and 
support the affected family. This may involve providing services or representing 
them in governmental institutions. Dealing with host communities as well as 
1 “Back to school” campaigns have been mainly supported by UNICEF and Save the Children in Jordan to 
encourage families to enroll their children in schools. 
2 The Jordanian Women’s Union has a branch in each of the 12 Jordanian governorates.
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refugees has led us to create programmes that cover both Jordanian and Syrian 
women. These programmes are mainly directed toward open discussion and the 
presentation of the problems women and in particular refugee women face. We 
have found that airing these issues openly leads to a sense of solidarity as well 
as an exchange of ideas and possible solutions. 
We have also run events for Jordanian and Syrian children between the ages of 
five and 17, who have experienced tension with their peers. We’ve found that 
once they participated in these events they became more familiar with each other 
and their relations became more normal.
As Jordanian activists, we are pushing for the government of Jordan to adopt UN 
resolution 1325 (Landmark Resolution on Women, Peace and Security)3. We have 
already trained our staff on its details and application. Adopting and applying it 
would help a lot in the case of Syrian women, especially in cases of harassment 
and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) against refugee women and girls.
JWU has previous experience with Iraqi women. How do you compare 
that to working with Syrian women?
The situation of Iraqi women was different from that of Syrian women. We 
provided similar services for them and hosted many at our safe houses, but 
they were referred to us by UNHCR because their focus was on applying for 
asylum. They saw asylum in Europe, Canada, Australia or the United States as 
the solution to their situation. Syrian women, in general, did not apply for asylum 
at the beginning, so our interventions were fast and we interacted directly with 
them. Services have also been delivered through CBOs and UNRWA’s Women 
Programmes Centres4 (WPCs), as a lot of Syrian families reside in Palestinian 
refugee camps because the rents there are significantly cheaper than in other 
areas. This actually makes our work easier, because we can use the existing 
facilities of the WPCs, and their volunteers help us to implement our activities 
there. At the beginning we faced some resistance. It was hard to convince the 
host communities in Palestinian refugee camps that Syrian refugees did not 
come to take their share and that they could peacefully coexist. It was a time-
consuming process, but eventually we managed to do that.
Do you actually provide the same services to Syrian and Jordanian 
women, and do you work in Syrian refugee camps?
Of course. We don’t categorise women. We provide the same services for all, 
but we take the particularity of refugee women into consideration. There are 
3 You can read the resolution in the following link: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1325(2000) 
4 WPCs were established by UNRWA during the 1970s and 1980s to specifically provide services to women in the camps. 
36
Alternative Voices on the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan: An Interview Collection
decisions that need to taken and interventions that need to be done promptly. 
We can say that there is some kind of prioritisation for refugees. As for the Syrian 
refugee camps: no, we don’t have offices there. But we conduct regular visits to 
these camps and participate in fund raising and winterisation campaigns.
UN agencies are the main service providers for Syrian refugees. Do you 
cooperate with them in implementing your programmes?
UNICEF supported us for the first three years of our work with Syrian refugees, 
and we might receive support from other UN agencies in the future. However, 
JWU is a sustainable organisation that continues its work whether or not it 
receives funding from the UN. The three years of support we received from 
UNICEF has now ended yet the project continues. Our clinics continue to provide 
free health services for Syrian women and their families regardless of whether 
we are funded or not. Even for urgent individual psychological interventions, 
which might be very expensive, we cover the costs if needed.
Can you speak about the major problems and challenges you face when 
working with Syrian refugees?
The two main problems are economic and health-related. Syrian families left 
their homes, belongings and income-generating activities behind when they 
fled the war and killing, sometimes arriving here only with the clothes on their 
backs. We started collecting donations for clothes, placing refugees with host 
families, or renting houses for them. These houses usually included more than 
one refugee family. We also focused on Syrian women economically. Since they 
are not integrated into Jordanian society and culture, we started vocational 
training programmes for women to practice income-generating activities from 
their homes. These activities include trainings on making natural soap, jam, 
beautification, embroidery, etc. In order to encourage their attendance we 
covered their transportation costs to the training centre. 
As for health issues, an influx of refugees brings with it diseases, emergency 
cases, injuries, trauma, etc. In such cases, a fast intervention plan is required. This 
was a challenge for our medical staff, which sometimes worked 24 hours a day 
to conduct follow-up visits at home and to provide medication. Another challenge 
was the complicated registration procedures of the Jordanian government. It was 
very stressful for our legal aid unit to follow up on the registration procedures, 
especially given the scale of the initial influx. 
Another challenge was mixing boys and girls in our activities. Syrian refugees 
come from very conservative backgrounds, and they often refuse to allow boys 
and girls to mix freely. We had difficulty working with children and families at the 
beginning, but now the situation is better in this regard. Child labour was one 
of the most challenging issues. A lot of the Syrian children who participated in 
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our activities were schools dropouts who worked in order to support their poor 
families. It is hard to convince very poor families that their children should go to 
school and that it is not their responsibility to work and support the family. We 
faced a lot of resistance from the families. We even started going to employers 
and telling them that it is illegal to employ children and we will hold them 
responsible if they continue using children as labourers.
Early marriage is another big problem. When we ask Syrian women at which age 
they got married, they would answer at 13 or 14. Many Syrians believe that if a girl 
is not married at 16 or 17 then it is a disaster for the family. We work intensively 
on this issue and have achieved some results, but it is still a big challenge. The 
crisis complicated this problem even more because of the lack of safety and 
stability. It increased fears regarding economic challenges and harassment, and 
many refugee families believe that their daughters will be safer if they are married.
Early marriage is severely restricted in Jordan. How do refugees 
circumvent such legal prohibitions?
Of course, not all marriage contracts are legally registered. There are cases where 
the marriage is documented solely on a piece of paper between the girl’s family 
and the husband. Jordanian law identifies the age of marriage at 18, whereas in 
Syria and Iraq it is 14 or 15. A Sharia judge is allowed to approve early marriage in 
exceptional cases, for example if the girl is orphaned or raped and over 15 years 
of age. Unfortunately, the exception has, in some places, become the rule. If the 
girl is under 15, then the marriage will not be officially registered. If the girl is 
between 15 and 18, however, the Sharia judge will generally use the exception.
What about relations between Jordanian and Syrian women? Do you feel 
they are based on competition or on solidarity, and does hate speech have 
an effect on that?
To be honest, in our five years of working with Syrian refugees we haven’t sensed 
any kind of competition between Jordanian and Syrian women. Jordanian families 
opened their houses to Syrian refugees and shared their resources with them. 
We know hate speech is out there and you can see it rather clearly sometimes, 
but there is political will in the country to fight and eliminate it. Sometimes, a poor 
Jordanian family might come and say ‘why did you give food to Syrians and not to 
us?’ This is normal. If you go to an area and distribute food to some poor people, 
other poor people will come later and say, ‘why didn’t you give food to me?’ These 
are individual cases, and they don’t necessarily represent a general feeling. Being 
all Arabs, we have similarities, but we are also able to distinguish each other. At 
the beginning of the crisis we were able to identify Syrian women walking on 
the street or Syrian children playing outside. Now, everybody looks the same. 
We cannot distinguish anymore. All Jordanians and Syrians are living in the same 
conditions and are facing the same challenges. The differences have melted away. 
‘Uncategorising Women’ – Women in the Syrian refugee crisis
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This is not the first time Jordan has faced an influx of refugees. Jordan has 
witnessed Palestinian refugees, Lebanese refugees during the Lebanese civil 
war and Iraqi refugees since 2003. Hostility and hate speech always exist, but in 
all cases people were able to adapt and coexist with the other. You hear things 
in the media or on the street, but at the end of the day these are all individual 
cases. We take our feedback from the people we work and deal with, whether 
they are Jordanians or Syrians, and we don’t see or even sense such hostility on 
the grassroots level.
What is your assessment regarding SGBV among Syrian women and girls, 
and how many cases have JWU registered?
JWU has its shelter programme, and we take in any woman living in Jordan 
regardless of her citizenship, religion, race, culture or age. The only criterion is 
that she has to be above 18 years old. This means that this service was provided 
to Syrian women as well as to any other woman. Two types of Syrian women 
come to the shelter: the first consists of those who lost their family, don’t have 
anyone to provide for them, or have nowhere else to go. The second type of 
woman has suffered from SGBV or domestic violence. We have yet to receive 
cases of sexual violence in which women were exploited for sex or raped. We 
have, however, received cases of women who were forced to work in nightclubs 
or were used for begging, which we identify as a type of trafficking. We cannot 
provide the exact number of cases, but we have more than 500 registered cases 
over the past five years.
What about cases of rape and/or harassment?
Such cases are not our specialty. They fall under the purview of the Family 
Protection Unit and the Public Security Directorate (the police), which maintain 
their own shelters for such cases. Even if we receive such cases, we directly refer 
them to the Family Protection Unit and they can proceed with them according to 
the law.
When it comes to working with Syrian women on topics related to gender, 
what is your perspective on the future? What approaches do you think are 
needed to work more efficiently with women in general and Syrian women 
specifically?
Change should come on two levels. First, we must change the preconceptions 
of the society at large, and this is a necessity. You cannot come to a society and 
impose new concepts on it – people will not process them. There should be 
long-term actions and plans in order to change stereotypes about women and to 
prevent the injustices done to them. This should be represented in everything we 
do: when working with children, schools, universities, governmental institutions 
and NGOs. We can call it a revolutionary change – a real change brought about by 
working with the entirety of society.
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Second, we are convinced that targeting men and women with our campaigns, 
programmes, projects, direct communications and advocacy is the only way to 
move forward on gender-related topics. We have worked on thousands of cases 
of families facing domestic problems or GBV. In each of these we don’t only work 
with the victim/survivor. We work with the entire circle: the family, the neighbours 
and anyone related to the problem through open counselling and coaching 
sessions. Our staff, especially our social workers and legal counsellors, are trained 
to deal with all members of the family. We have achieved big successes on both 
the individual and group levels. For example, if a woman has suffered from GBV 
or domestic violence and accepts this situation as her reality, we go to the male 
and work with him. We focus on coaching people on how to discuss rather than 
abuse, then we move to group sessions and work with all members of the family.
Challenging stereotypes and injustice toward women should happen on the level 
of the community at large, but it must also take place on the level of the family. 
In some cases, such as when betrothed couples face problems or challenges 
before marriage, we conduct sessions to help eliminate any potential for future 
complications. We have many success stories in working individually with men or 
women, as well as with families in general. Being able to convince men to come 
and attend sessions is a huge success by itself. There was a time where this was 
a taboo and an invasion to the male domain, but by now this has changed. We see 
men as partners in solving the problems.
It is not easy to speak with Syrian professionals in the field because of the 
precarious legal status many face when it comes to employment. Many 
organisations active in the field do, however, have Syrian volunteers. These 
men and women are usually paid a small compensation for their efforts, 
and JWU is no exception to this. One of their volunteers gave us a brief 
insight into her biography and her motivation to work with JWU.  
I came to Jordan before the crisis – ten years ago. When the crisis began I couldn’t 
go back to Syria to visit anymore, so I haven’t been there in five years. I came 
to JWU three years ago, and before that I was a volunteer with the Jordanian 
Churches Association. I first encountered JWU as a patient in one of their clinics, 
and then I started telling other Syrian women about JWU and the services they 
provide. After that, I volunteered to work in the clinic for a year, helping to provide 
medication to people who couldn’t afford it. We collected prescriptions, and then 
went to doctors and institutions willing to donate the required medicines. Later 
on, I learned about the projects targeting Syrians and volunteered to help in these 
projects. I have been doing this for the past three years.
I was also a volunteer with Save the Children Jordan. There I worked on an 
educational project regarding breastfeeding and reproductive health. However, 
when we started implementing activities in Syrian refugee camps I encountered 
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problems in getting security clearance to enter the camp. Being a Syrian living 
in the host community, it is not easy to volunteer inside Syrian refugee camps. 
Accordingly, I now work through CBOs and charity organisations.
I first came to Jordan because I got married. My husband was working here 
before the crisis, and I joined him before I finished high school. Since I got married 
young, I didn’t finish my education. However my father, who died in Syria eight 
months ago, used to be a professor of the Arabic language at Homs University. 
Since then I have been trying to finish my high school degree, but being away 
from my family and worried about their safety has not allowed me to concentrate 
on my courses. Now, my main focus is to finish my high school degree and then 
go to university to continue my education.
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‘Humanity is the salvation’ 
– A Syrian Intellectual in 
Exile
Interview with Wael Qaddour, 13.8.2015
Wael Qaddour is a Syrian playwright and director. He graduated from the Syrian 
Higher Institute for Dramatic Arts in 2005 with a BA degree in theatrical arts. He 
has written and directed many plays for the theatre and worked in investigative 
journalism in the field of social inquiries. He also worked as a monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) specialist for interactive theatre and art projects at the Syria 
Trust for Development until he left Syria in 2011. Qaddour now lives in Amman, 
Jordan,where he continues to work in the fields of play writing, directing and 
advertisement.
What was your experience in Syria during the crisis and when you came to 
Jordan, and why have you chosen Jordan?
I was in Damascus when the crisis started, but I didn’t stay long in Syria 
afterwards – only around eight months. At the time I was newly married and 
the fields in which I worked were starting to close,meaning that true journalism 
ceased to exist in Syria in 2011. The Syrian Trust for Development is a different 
story because it is still functioning up to now. Our situation as staff was awkward: 
we were working in an organisation supported by the presidential palace – the 
Trust is headed by Asma’a al-Asad, the wife of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad – 
and the situation was escalating rapidly. It was clear that there was suppression 
in the suburbs of Damascus and later urban Damascus; everybody knew that. 
There was a peaceful movement that was being repressed. When some of my 
colleagues and I learned that the Trust had adopted the official opinion of the 
Syrian regime, each of us quit working for the organisation in a different way.
Some resigned directly, while others refused to renew their work contracts once 
they expired. I belonged to the second group.
What made our situation more urgent was that I was wanted for the mandatory 
army service, which I refused to do knowing that the regime uses the army to 
supress people. The Syrian army was deeply involved in that. Jordan was one 
of three choices, the other two being Lebanon and Egypt. Lebanon wasn’t a 
preferred choice for us, so it came down to Jordan and Egypt.We chose Jordan 
because my wife’s family had been living in Amman for 17 years at that time;they 
received and supported us upon our arrival.
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If your wife’s family had not been living in Jordan, would you still have 
chosen it?
No, I would have gone to Egypt. I was a participant in a workshop about cultural 
management in Egypt organised by a big cultural organisation there, and they 
offered me a good job opportunity. But since my wife’s family was in Jordan 
she preferred to come here. In addition to that, the borders between Jordan 
and Syria were open and the travel for Syrians was easy at that time, so we 
decided to come to Jordan. It was a risk coming to a country I don’t know; I just 
visited Jordan for very short periods before the Syria crisis. Of course, after the 
Jordanian government began to enforce travel restrictions for Syrians in June 
2014,1things became harder for us.
Did you find opportunities in Jordan?
I consider myself one of the lucky ones. My previous professional experience 
and my early arrival into Jordan allowed me to work with many institutions as a 
drama coach and theatrical director during 2012, 2013 and 2014. I was also able 
to direct small performances and provide training in the fields of creative writing, 
editing and copy writing. It was relatively easy for me to find work. Living with my 
wife’s family in the first few months also helped make our life easier. Compared 
to others with no experience – fresh graduates, undergraduates – or those who 
came later, my life was much easier. They are the ones who are suffering. Most 
of them have left Jordan or plan on leaving because the living conditions here are 
hard. Jordan is an expensive country.Even in Syria, where there is war now, the 
living cost is much lower compared to Jordan. So those who can’t work can’t live 
here.
Do you see yourself as a refugee, and do others see you as a refugee or as 
an artist?
My wife and I refuse to be framed as refugees. The image of the refugee does 
not represent us and is not in our best interest. The answer is certainly more 
complicated than that, but this is the easiest way to put it. We registered with 
UNHCR recently, three years after our arrival to Jordan, but we only did this to get 
a certain type of legal status and legal protection.
Regarding how people see me: I met most of the people I know through joint 
projects and work. In this domain I focus on work or common concerns, and that 
prevents the relationship from being limited by the refugee frame, which limits 
interaction and helps reproduce persecution. By that I mean that the desire of the 
host community to place someone within a certain frame eventually serves as a 
1 In June 2014, the Government of Jordan implemented restrictions on the travel of Syrians: only Syrians with official residencies in other 
countries (such as Europe, USA or the Gulf States) and those who are not registered as refugees are now allowed to come to Jordan and 
leave freely.
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form of persecution. For me to adopt such a frame would be self-defeating, as it 
would minimise my options. 
My wife and I chose to pursue multiple options when it comes to friendships and 
work. I chose to work and my wife chose to finish her Master’s degree in English 
literature in Jordan.She graduated recently. Our actions were based on our choice 
to be activists outside Syria in as many spheres as possible. I can’t say that we 
weren’t empowered: we are not very young, we had some savings that helped 
us, and we have people supporting us. We were able to choose not to be put in 
this box. Unfortunately, most Syrians were not, which has created different types 
of persecution against them including hate speech. 
So, your opinion is that the society looks at you in the frame you put 
yourself in, meaning that there are no prejudgements and stereotypes. Is 
your point that refugees are responsible for how people look at them?
Let me rearrange my idea. The discourse of the host community – whether it 
is Lebanese, Jordanian or Egyptian, and regardless of the political, economic, 
social, religious or ethnic situation – is necessarily violent. It is violent because 
the easiest way for a community to perceive you is to put you in a frame or a 
box. This makes it easier to deal with the ‘other’. Our personal choice was not to 
be put in this box, but still there were silly and stupid situations with taxi drivers 
or shopkeepers where they tried to put us in this frame. Such moments might 
be perceived as offensive, if you want to see it that way. But being aware of the 
context of the two cultures allows you to see the broader picture and not to take 
such situations personally.
This approach increases your productivity within society. Anything healthy 
or positive I do in this society is not driven by a gesture of generosity, but is 
governed by basic human values. Trying to keep this in mind has allowed for us to 
escape the harm that comes from being perceived as a refugee in a host country. 
This is your view as an intellectual.What do you think about the simple 
person who doesn’t have the luxury of choice, who is governed by his/her 
surrounding and common way of thinking?
My above answer was regarding my personal choices. As part of my work, I 
have participated in a lot of projects and activities that bring together Jordanian 
and Syrian children and youth. Most have involved story-telling performances, 
radio stories, arts and writing. The objective wasn’t to directly integrate them; it 
was a process of meeting and discussing their common problems and concerns. 
Such activities were part of well-designed projects and they worked. But out in 
daily life the ordinary person, on both sides, will adopt the use of hate speech.
There are hundreds of examples, and it has created a kind of vengeful search 
for dignity among the Syrians in Jordan. Syrians regard themselves as superior. 
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They come from a country that was self-sufficient, a country that is cheap to 
live in, and that has a strong political and economic status in the region. This is 
how the Syrian regime and Syrians perceived Syria before 2011. Overnight, they 
found themselves living in tents or in small suburban apartments, with people 
feeling pity for them, and pity here is a sort of aggression, in addition to the 
direct aggression practiced against them. They found themselves in a situation 
that made them feel they have to be defensive, and suddenly all the stereotypes 
came to the surface.
You describe yourself as an intellectual. In your opinion, what are the 
problems and challenges facing the non-intellectual Syrian refugee in 
Jordan?
There are the legal problems of course, especially the limitations on work. 
Jordan’s Ministry of Labour doesn’t give work permits for Syrian refugees – unlike 
other people residing in Jordan, such as Egyptians and workers from Eastern 
Asia, who are permitted to work. It is clear that this is a political decision. Syrian 
investors are excluded of course because of their status.They have established 
factories and businesses in the country, so they are allowed to have a quota of 
foreign workers, including fellow Syrians. From my observations over the past 
four years, it is clear that Syrians work low wages and in bad working conditions 
because they don’t have work permits. This hasled to worsening living conditions 
and to deteriorating health and educational situations.
This has also prompted the formation of closed communities for Syrians who 
feel oppressed, which only serve to isolate them even more from Jordanian 
communities. They see that they are outside of the legalised workforce and are 
being prosecuted by the Ministry of Labour, in addition to the big limitations on 
their freedom of movement. Many have tried to go to Turkey,which they consider 
a better temporary alternative than Jordan and Lebanon. In general, the main 
challenges Syrian refugees face in Jordan relate to legal status, education, and 
health services. This goes for middle class Syrians as well. Even Syrians who 
came to Jordan in the eighties2 are now being treated as refugees, and they feel 
frustrated by that.
Putting aside studies, official reports and stereotypes: how do you see the 
statement that “Syrian refugees are a burden on Jordan”?
I find the idea that “Syrians are a burden” hard to believe. From my daily 
observations, businesses are growing and companies are recruiting more and 
2 Most of this group came to Jordan after the events of Hama in 1982, when the Syrian regime besieged and bombed the city that was the 
stronghold of the Islamic Brotherhood, and killedat least 10,000 people of the city’s population. As a result, thousands fled to Jordan and 
have been living in the country since then without facing any of the challenges that Syrian refugees face today. In addition, there are Syrians 
residing in Jordan before the crisis for economic reasons. The Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation estimates that 
750,000 Syrians were living in Jordan before the start of the Syria crisis. 
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more every day.I can’t say that I have a clear answer your question, but I will 
speak from Jordan’s cultural policy point of view as I know it very well. As a person 
working in the cultural industry in Jordan, I can say that it is the least affected 
sector. It has actually benefited from Syrian artists coming to Jordan, although the 
majority of Syrian artists went to Lebanon, Egypt or Turkey. The few who came 
have actively participated in this industry, but most of them have left Jordan by 
this point. The style of Jordanian cultural policy is binary. There is the classical old 
model, where the state designs and supports cultural production, and there is the 
new model,where culture is a sponsored industry and this increases the quality 
of the cultural product. Since the cultural identity of Jordan is very similar to the 
Syrian cultural identity, in the sense of being an Arab-Islamic identity, there have 
been opportunities for Syrian artists to work here. But the support for Jordanian 
artists is very limited in the first place, so there are no prospects for Syrian artists 
living here.What I want to say is that Syrian artists and intellectuals who came to 
Jordan didn’t constitute any burden.
Speaking about myself, my experience is limited in comparison to other Syrian 
artists, and a lot of opportunities were opened to me through projects and 
networking. I also haven’t worked under any state-supported cultural projects, 
which are small, directed, and only benefit Jordanian artists. As for the map of 
foreign or Jordanian cultural funding: it is well-structured, and as long as I am able 
to be part of it and create partnerships then my livelihood is secure.According 
to everybody I met, Syrians and Jordanians, the Jordanian cultural sector can 
easily accommodate all the Syrian artists and intellectuals who came to Jordan 
due to growing demand. To be frank, I am one of those who benefited from this 
situation.
You mentioned that, as an artist, you work with regional and/
or international supporters. Does this come from a feeling of weak 
connections with Jordanian artists?
Individual artists don’t start their own businesses in Jordan, so they are 
necessarily part of working projects or institutions, be they governmental or non-
governmental. All those artists worked with their Syrian counterparts, and this 
helped creating a lively scene. All accepted being part of other projects since they 
cannot start their own cultural project. There is no renouncing or constriction of 
Syrian artists, just nice partnerships developing on many levels.
You are certainly following theongoing humanitarian interventions by UN 
agencies, NGOs and the Government of Jordan. How do you evaluate such 
interventions?
The Government of Jordan always approves charity or relief projects, meaning that 
anyone can start his/her own organisation and work on providing consumables 
such as food, clothes and medicine. Projects that don’t exist until now are the 
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ones that include actual empowerment and skills building of refugees on all 
levels. Such projects like micro-financing and vocational training are not allowed. 
On the level of culture, there are projects but they are rarely sustainable. Most 
are ready-made strategies drafted by the donors without the participation of the 
beneficiary. Such projects are distant from the real needs; they all speak about 
integration but with no real impact. These projects aim at implementing proposals 
without a true value, it is all about humanitarian issues and aid without the actual 
development and/or the capacity building of refugees.
What do you wish for regarding the cultural, economic, political and 
intellectual roles that Syrians could or should play in Jordan?
I wish that Syrian intellectuals who remained in Jordan would stay, including 
myself. I wish that their situation will be reconsidered in order to facilitate their 
mobility and travel. This is very important for them to feel able to participate 
and tobe part of a bigger picture. A lot of cultural projects that include Syrian 
intellectuals face difficulties because of the limitations on their travels and visits, 
so they can’t design their projects properly. There are security fears in Jordan, 
especially with regard to ISIS, but when you speak about artists and intellectuals 
it should be a different story. The needs of this group are minimal: they need a 
legal status, integration into cultural projects, and free movement from and to 
Jordan. I wish that the Jordanian Ministry of Culture would be able to invest 
in Syrian artists and intellectuals, and do more projects with them within a 
professional frame.
These wishes can be generalised to the community of Syrian refugees more 
broadly. There is cruelty because some basic human rights are being confiscated, 
such as the right to work and the freedom of mobility. We all know that such 
rights are constitutionally guaranteed in Jordan. It is established that refugees are 
a vulnerable group, and treating this group cruelly will only bring negative results. 
When there is hate speech on both sides that is being adopted even by children, 
eventually the society at large will pay the price. The victimized will reproduce 
aggression against the community.
Imagine this in the long term. I wish for the establishment of a comprehensive, 
rights-based movement that consists of Jordanian and Syrian advocates working 
to legalise the existence of Syrians in Jordan. Such work should start on the 
grassroots level,and then transform into actual lobbying in order to produce a 
legal bill to be discussed in the parliament. Even if it failed, at least it would 
be a starting point. Syrians don’t want to be resettled or become Jordanian 
citizens, but they should be given a status that allows them to make positive 
contributions to the society. I am speaking not only for the sake of Syrians but 
also Jordanians.Once the crisis is over most Syrians will go back home, but what 
they accomplished while here will remain.
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Where do you see the future of Syria and why?
I can’t read what’s happening to be honest, but it seems dark. There are the 
escalating fights, a lot of complications and the fractures caused by sectarian 
violence, which is very hard to mend in the current circumstances. Sometimes 
I fear a Lebanon-like solution where sects agree to freeze the war without any 
kind of transitional justice for people, which will leave the society fractured and 
divided; states within states. Sometimes I fear a duplication of the Iraqi scenario, 
federalism and regions. The short-term political situation of Syria might be 
something in between the two, I really don’t know. I am someone working in arts 
and culture, but I do have a sincere opinion on two points: first, it became evident 
that using religion in political speech is catastrophic on all levels; unfortunately, 
countries like Jordan aremaking the samemistake, and Egypt beforethem. This 
brings me to my second point, which is related to the concept of homeland. At 
this stage I am extremely skeptical about the concept of homeland. I believe 
that the policies of all governments in this region misused the concept; I now 
think that the concept of homeland itself is wrong, it should be put under the 
microscope and reconsidered. If any group is worse than the religious extremists, 
then it isthe nationalist/patriotic extremists3, regardless of their political affiliations. 
Radicalising the concept of homeland and national identity, saying “I am Syrian”, 
“I am Lebanese”, “I am Jordanian” is an extension of the identity crisis. People 
don’t know who politically represents them anymore; especially now that all 
current actors in the political arena are reproducing the authoritarian discourse 
that brought us to where we are today. I believe that the only salvation for people 
living in this region is to re-question the concept of homeland and its credibility 
because it is only leading to more extremism among all those involved.
Do you think the origin to this problem lies in the Sykes-Picot Agreement4?
Absolutely. In the years between the Sykes-Picot Agreement and now, Arab 
governments were unable to develop a truly citizenship-based discourse. For 
example, in pre-revolutionary Syria the value of an individual was governed only 
by his or her money or sect. There is no political life in Syria, just wealth, religion, 
sect and social class. The word “I am Syrian” means nothing now, and it should 
mean nothing. Being fanatic about national identities lead to conflicts and clashes 
because people haven’t experienced the concepts of true citizenship. So when 
you see people saying “I am a proud citizen” and you look at their daily life,you 
will easily discover that they don’t have equal opportunities. Where is the concept 
of citizenship in this case? We are just reproducing the ancient tribal norms, and 
3 The original Arabic term ‘watani’ (‘nationalist’/ ‘patriotic’) used here has a much less negative ring among most political currents in the Arab 
region, and indicates a meaning closer to the English term ‹patriotic›  than to ‘nationalist’. However, Qaddour criticizes both usages of the 
term.
4 The so-called ‘Sykes-Picot Agreement’ (1916) was a secret agreement between the governments of the United Kingdom and France that 
defined their proposed spheres of influence and control in the Middle East after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. 
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religious discourse isbeing used to enhance such division. Today, I don’t represent 
myself as Syrian. I try to focus more on the common factor – the human factor 
– because our salvation lies there. Regimes and governments will never adopt 
such a thing. The hope lies with those initiators working on the ground, those 
who should forsake all these prejudgments and obsolete concepts about national 
identities and citizenship. No one has the right to tell who is patriotic and who is 
not.
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‘There is no comparison’ – 
Palestinian refugees and 
the role of UNRWA in the 
Syrian refugee crisis
Interview with Matar Saqer, former UNRWA spokesperson, 13.8.2015 
Matar Saqer was the spokesperson of the United Nations Relief Works Agency 
(UNRWA) in Jordan from 1985 to 2011. As such, Saqer followed the influx of 
different refugee populations, including Syrians, into Jordan from the perspective 
of the agency specifically responsible for catering to Palestinian refugees. 
Palestinians comprise the largest refugee group in Jordan and, as such, they 
possess a unique place in the country’s history and politics. 
Please tell us a little bit about your personal and professional relations to 
refugees in Jordan.  
I am a refugee myself. I am a Palestinian refugee, born in a refugee camp. I was 
born in a tent and lived through all the stages of refugee life. When I turned six 
years old, as the eldest son I had to queue for food handouts from UNRWA. I 
also started to go to UNRWA schools and clinics. Then the tents were gradually 
replaced by UNRWA with brick rooms and asbestos roofs, until the refugee camps 
in Jordan became what they are today: suburbs and urban quarters connected 
and linked to nearby cities. 
So when you talk about refugees, I am saddled and bridled by UNRWA. This was 
the case even before I was born: during the time of conception, my mother visited 
an UNRWA clinic. So I consider myself and UNRWA as twins – we were born 
together in a way. UNRWA was established by the United Nations in 1949, and 
started operations in 1950. Being a refugee of course was a special experience. To 
be referred to as refugees, as people who do not belong, shaped my thinking and 
that of my generation. Even today, when you think that this Jordanian-Palestinian 
tension should be gone, it sometimes comes to the surface. The other day, I 
heard someone, a 22- or 23-year-old boy shouting at a neighbour: “you (blank) 
refugee; you better return to your home in Palestine.” We have been here for over 
60 years, and there are still these voices. Who taught that boy to differentiate, 
and to consider me or this other person as not belonging? That sense of not 
belonging has always been part of the definition of a refugee. 
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Professionally speaking, I was spokesperson for UNRWA for 26 years. I retired in 
2011, but I still work for UNRWA as a consultant so I am on top of developments. 
So in a way I still wear the UNRWA hat, not only because I work as a consultant 
but also because my heart is there. It is a lifelong principle and a mission for me. 
While I was spokesperson, I never said something for the sake of propaganda, 
or for the sake of embellishing the agency. No, I said it out of my heart and out 
of conviction. 
How do you relate to the Syrian refugee crisis? What do you think are 
its main effects in Jordan, particularly when you think about Palestinian 
refugees? 
I studied English literature in Damascus, Syria, so I am aware of the dynamics of 
the Syrian community. I also used to visit Yarmouk camp1 in Syria to see friends 
and university colleagues living there. In 1970, when there was unrest in Jordan, 
many Palestinian refugees took refuge in Syria for a few weeks and then returned. 
Now we face a very different situation. My professional relationship with the 
Syrian crisis started a few years ago. The crisis was only starting when I retired in 
2011, but I continued to follow the news. The Syrian crisis in Jordan increased the 
burden on an already burdened government. The number of Palestinian refugees 
registered with UNRWA in the country is currently about 2.2 million. This does 
not include the displaced persons,2 and now there is also a large number of Syrian 
refugees.  
When the Syrian influx into Jordan gradually rose to an alarming number of 
people crossing on a daily basis, the government decided to set up Za’atari camp 
for them. But many refugees also found their way into the cities and ended 
up living in squatter areas, low-income areas, Palestinian refugee camps, and 
other suburbs in Amman and other Jordanian cities. This increased the burden 
on the already burdened communities. First of all, what was immediately felt 
were the rental prices, which went up significantly. There was a hike in rental 
prices in Baqa’a camp, for example, but also in Jabal Al-Nuzha, which is not a 
1 Yarmouk camp is unofficial refugee camp on the outskirts of Damascus. It was home to the largest Palestinian refugee community in Syria 
until the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. 
2 Palestinian refugees are those who were born in Palestine or whose normal place of residence was Palestine for at least two years before 
1948, and who lost both their home and their means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 events, as well as their descendants. UNRWA 
services are available to all those who live within its area of operations, are registered with the agency, and are in need of assistance. In 
Jordan, UNRWA established four camps after 1948: Zarqa camp, Jabal Hussein, Irbid camp, and Wihdat (Amman New Camp). Another influx 
from the West Bank into the Jordanian East Bank came during the Arab-Israeli war and the occupation of the West Bank in 1967, and six more 
camps were established both for Palestinian refugees and displaced persons. By that time, the West Bank had become a part of Jordan. Many 
of those who came to the East Bank were already Palestinian refugees living in the West Bank in refugee camps. Those who were already 
registered with UNRWA continued to be referred to as refugees (sometimes also as ‘second time’ refugees, or displaced refugees). Yet there 
were also many indigenous inhabitants of the West Bank in this wave. These original West Bankers are considered displaced persons, given 
that they left one part of the country to another part of the same country. Since the 1990s, many registered refugees stopped registering their 
newborns with UNRWA, so that not all descendants of registered refugees are counted as registered refugees in the above definition.
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camp. Basically, the influx affected all poor and low-income areas in the country. 
It became very difficult to find a free shelter,3 and if you did then it could be twice 
the price it used to be. It became a burden for both the refugees and the local 
people who were looking for places to live. 
The effect of the Syrian influx can also be seen with regard to jobs. Syrians 
largely work in seasonal jobs or as casual labour, meaning that in winter they 
sometimes work in agriculture in the Jordan Valley, when it is the time for olive 
picking. In summer, they work in the construction business. Many of them work 
as assistants, as simple labourers. I am talking about the majority; I am not 
talking about the professionals. I have not seen Syrian refugees working here 
as professionals, such as engineers. Many are shop assistants. If you now go 
to any place, especially restaurants, many have Syrian workers. Indeed, many 
restaurants that are famous in Damascus have now opened in Amman. 
How is this additional influx received in your experience? 
My general experience is that newcomers are not always welcomed. A good 
example for this would be the crisis that erupted after the occupation of Kuwait by 
Saddam Hussein in 1990. There were many Palestinians among the people who 
came back to Jordan, around 300,000 people or 10% of the population at the time. 
This was a strain on the infrastructure and on the job market. The economy was 
suffering from stagnation and recession at the time following the economic boom 
during the mid-1970s. This influx was an additional burden on the government 
and the working people. When the returnees came from Kuwait, the Palestinian 
refugees in Jordan were not very welcoming. We used to advertise vacancies 
in UNRWA, and the Palestinian refugees from Kuwait spoke excellent English 
and were much more qualified for office work than their Palestinian brethren in 
the country. Many of the latter came and said: “Look guys, we should have a 
quota. Our right has to be preserved regarding the recruitment from among the 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan. They have been enjoying good salaries in Kuwait, 
and now they are coming back.” To share with them the same resources, the 
same number of jobs and infrastructure, was not an easy thing. 
It is the same with the Syrian refugees. Many of them have ended up living 
in Palestinian refugee camps, and that means that UNRWA has had to accept 
their children in UNRWA schools – not only the children of Palestinian refugee 
families, but in many cases UNRWA has had to accept Syrian children. There are 
no schools in these camps other than those of UNRWA. So by default, UNRWA 
has had to accept the children of the families who live in refugee camps and who 
have official residence status there. 
3 UNRWA calls the housing units it deals with shelters (rather than apartments) because they are often made of very simple materials, 
especially in the refugee camps. 
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Is accepting anyone who lives in UNRWA camps to UNRWA schools no matter 
their origin an established practice, i.e. something that existed before the Syrian 
influx? 
Indeed. Approximately 120,000 boys and girls study at the 170 UNRWA schools in 
Jordan. UNRWA provides ten years of schooling. Inside refugee camps, UNRWA 
has to accept the children of Palestinian refugees, of displaced persons, and of 
any other family living there. Outside the camps, it depends on whether there 
is space or not. Of the 120,000 students at UNRWA schools, perhaps 100,000 
are pure Palestinian refugees. Of the remainder, the majority are displaced 
Palestinians (DPs), the children of Syrians and Palestinian refugees from Syria 
(PRS). 
Accepting Syrian children or PRS in UNRWA schools has been a burden. This is 
true not only in terms of the volume or size of work, but also in terms of special 
problems. For example, sometimes you have to make up for the lost schooling 
days or you have to make adjustments to the curriculum. But more important 
is introducing what is called “education in emergency programmes.” Many of 
the children are traumatised, having seen their dear ones killed or their houses 
demolished, so you need such special programmes. UNRWA has been doing 
that not only in Jordan but also in Lebanon, where a large number of Palestinian 
refugees ended up, and in the Gaza Strip. Even the UNRWA schools in Syria, 
some of which still operate, now have introduced emergency aid, education 
in emergency programmes and psycho-social programmes. Education cannot 
wait. When a refugee issue arises, when an earthquake takes place, or a man-
made crisis or a natural disaster occurs, people normally think of tents, food and 
medicine as the priorities. But UNRWA is saying: “look guys, education is as 
important. Equip children for the future.” 
How would you see the role of UNRWA, politically and in relation to its 
target population? How does it compare to that of UNHCR? 
During my work with UNRWA I have never felt threatened in the communities 
in which we live. UNRWA is friends with the Palestinians. The UNRWA logo, the 
blue flag in itself, used to be considered as a mark of safety in refugee camps. 
UNRWA has always been living among refugees. I have not, in my life, heard 
of a security attack on UNRWA, or of a politically motivated attack. So UNRWA 
has always been considered as a friendly element. This is for good reason, as 
the role it has played in the life of refugees is unprecedented. You know, there 
is no organisation in the world like UNRWA, in that it has been associated with 
the same group of people for more than 60 years. There is a unique relationship 
between UNRWA and the refugees. It is a long journey based on mutual interest 
and mutual respect. People sometimes talk about a love-hate relationship when 
you mention UNRWA because it is a reminder of the Palestinian catastrophe, and 
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many refugees see UNRWA as an alternative to returning them to their home. 
Instead of sending them back to their homes or allowing them to return, the world 
has created an organisation to help them. The provision of assistance by UNRWA 
for all these 60+ years has become a symbol of the Palestinian refugees’ rights. 
In fact, every time there was ambiguity in the region about political solutions – for 
example when the Oslo Accords were signed between the Palestinian Authority 
and Israel – people were looking to UNRWA to see what we were doing or not 
doing, so as to read the future. 
UNRWA has always been living and working in a volatile environment. No 
organisation in the world has weathered political storms, crises and problems 
like UNRWA: the Suez war in 1956, in which Israel occupied the Gaza strip and 
the Egyptian Sinai; the war of 1967, when there was another influx of Palestinians 
from the West Bank and Gaza into Jordan; the war in South Lebanon in 1978; a 
second war there in 1982 when Israel occupied South Lebanon; the first intifada; 
the second intifada; and then the embargo and the wars in Gaza. These are 
only the most important of a series of events. UNRWA has weathered all these 
storms. And unlike other UN organisations or embassies that used to evacuate 
their international staff for their safety, the international staff of UNRWA stayed 
behind. So UNRWA was there to deal with the aftermath of every crisis that 
happened in the Middle East.
So how would you compare UNRWA and UNHCR, and the status of 
Palestinians vs. that of Syrian refugees?  
To me, there is no comparison between UNHCR and UNRWA in that sense. 
UNHCR was established one year after UNRWA. It deals with refugees all over 
the world, with the exception of Palestinian refugees. When UNRWA was set 
up, the Palestinians were the only refugee group. Now, registered Palestinian 
refugees number about 5.1 million, compared to 13 million refugees of concern 
for UNHCR, as well as the many more internally displaced people that are 
increasingly falling under its purview. I have heard that there were attempts to 
amalgamate UNRWA with UNHCR when the latter was first set up, but the Arab 
governments opposed this. 
The mandates of UNHCR and UNRWA also differ. The three traditional solutions 
for refugees serviced by UNHCR are to be absorbed in the country of refuge, 
returned to their homes or transferred to a third country. UNRWA has a special 
mandate, which is to provide assistance to Palestinian refugees until we reach a 
settlement of their issues. A Palestinian refugee has the right to return. The UN 
General Assembly issued resolution 194 in 1948, which says that the Palestinian 
refugees should be allowed to return to their homes at the earliest practicable 
date, and that those who opt not to return to the properties they lost or left behind 
in Palestine should be compensated. So you cannot put a Palestinian refugee on 
equal footing with other refugees in the world. 
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Now there is a war in Syria between different Syrian factions, or between the 
opposition and the regime, with some intervention from here and there. I think 
sooner or later the Syrian crisis will come to an end. It is not an issue between 
occupier and occupied. In Palestine, the refugees were expelled. When the 
Syrians left now and came to Jordan, they knew that their country is called Syria. 
It is an Arab country, and their return is guaranteed once this comes to an end and 
there is a settlement, and once there is reconciliation. What prevents them from 
going back once the war comes to an end? They can go back! In comparison, the 
hopes of the Palestinian refugees to return to their country are more a theory than 
a practical option. The horizon is pretty dim for resolving the Palestinian crisis. The 
solution that the Palestinians dream about – the return – does not seem possible 
in the foreseeable future. 
So in my view these are the main differences between Syrian and Palestinian 
refugees. They are very large. Palestinian refugees have been living as refugees 
for 67 years. There are Syrian refugees now, but it is a matter of time and all will 
return. Even if they opt not to return and manage to live elsewhere by choice, 
they know they have a country called Syria and they will not be called refugees. 
Maybe I sound naive, but this is a major difference. 
UNRWA is responsible for Palestinians coming from Syria (and other 
countries) to its areas of operation. What have your experiences been in 
this regard? There are rumours about Palestinians coming from Syria with 
forged Syrian documents, who then register with UNHCR as Syrians, and 
simultaneously with UNRWA as Palestinians. Can you confirm this? 
I would not be surprised if this was the case. Many of those holding Palestinian 
travel documents as refugees would throw them away out of fear that the 
Jordanian government would send them back or not accept them. You know, 
Jordan has always been saying that “we have had our share of refugees - Jordan 
is not a dump site for every refugee crisis.” There was an influx of Palestinians 
from Iraq after 2003, for example. Ruwayshed camp (at the Iraqi border) and 
others were set up, and Jordan denied them entry, saying “no way you are 
going to stay, because if we agree then all the Palestinian refugees will come to 
Jordan.” Jordan’s position on that is very adamant: no more Palestinian refugees 
in Jordan, so as to avoid shifting the demographic balance. 
Some Palestinian refugees from Syria have been put into Cyber City 
camp – a camp specifically established for this group of people. Are there 
precedents for such a practice of separating refugees by origin? 
Indeed, Cyber City is a camp specifically established for Palestinian refugees 
from Syria. To my knowledge, some UNRWA revenues are committed there, and 
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UNRWA is providing services, such as mobile health teams.4 There is a precedent 
for this: Ruwayshed camp, which I just mentioned, and which was established at 
the Jordanian-Iraqi border in 2003. After the toppling of Saddam Hussein, some 
Palestinian quarters in Baghdad were attacked in retaliation by the surrounding 
communities, and they were anxious about their security. Many came to Jordan 
and some went to Syria, where another camp was set up on the border between 
Syria and Iraq. So yes, Ruwayshed camp was mainly for Palestinians from Iraq 
who did not enjoy residency status in Jordan, while others were allowed to enter 
Jordan or transit through it. But eventually all of them were transferred to a third 
country.
I participated in the effort at Ruwayshed. We gave some cash assistance to 
those who were in immediate need, and helped the students who were at 
the universities and wanted our intervention on their behalf to be accepted in 
Jordan. I visited the families there, and did not find any non-Palestinians. It was 
administered by the Jordanian Red Crescent Society. About 380 individuals 
were granted entry on “compassionate grounds”. Most of them were Jordanian 
women married to holders of Palestinian documents. 
But UNRWA was not only active there. In 1995, the Palestinians were expelled 
from Libya, and they ended up stranded on the border between Egypt and Libya. 
UNRWA and UNHCR then established makeshift camps together, and UNRWA 
introduced education for refugees there. So there is a history of cooperation 
between UNHCR and UNRWA. Actually, this history started with the Kuwait crisis 
in 1990.5 UNRWA had a role in this crisis, even though it was not directly related 
to Palestinian refugees. There was an influx of many people immediately after the 
crisis – Sri Lankans, UN employees, many transients. Around one million people 
left for their countries through Jordan. So you had transit centres in different 
parts of Amman, e.g. in schools. And UNRWA would help, because we were the 
only UN organisation with vehicles and infrastructure, with a fleet, buildings, and 
clinics. There was no UNHCR office in Jordan at the time. UNRWA participated 
in providing first base reception for UN employees that were evacuated from 
Baghdad, and helped them with logistics to travel to their countries. 
4 More information about Cyber City and PRS is available at:  http://www.unrwa.org/prs-jordan.  
5 The Kuwait crisis erupted when, after Jordan’s tacit support for Saddam Hussein’s attack on Kuwait in 1990, the Kuwaiti government expelled 
around 300,000 labour migrants. The great majority was of Palestinian origin and held Jordanian nationality. 
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Let us return to the situation today. The current big question for UNRWA is 
funding. Do you think the current funding shortage is related to the Syria 
crisis, because most of the funds are channelled into the Syria response, 
leaving UNRWA behind? Or is it a natural development that UNRWA 
would lose funds anyway, even if there were no Syria crisis? 
UNRWA has always been suffering from chronic financial shortfalls and deficits. 
These deficits accumulate every year, but every six to eight years the problem 
reaches crisis levels. The difference between now and former crises is that the 
priorities have shifted. As long as the Arab-Israeli conflict was the main problem 
in the Middle East UNRWA’s financial situation was much better. Now look around 
you. Where does the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the Palestinian cause stand among 
the crises in the region? You have the crisis in Iraq, the crisis in Yemen, the crisis 
in Syria, the crisis in Libya, you have the Ebola outbreak. In addition to this, and 
perhaps more important, you have the Greek economy and the danger it poses 
to other European economies. So there are seven or eight issues on the global 
agenda that overshadow the Palestinian crisis. The Arab-Israeli conflict used to be 
priority number one in the world, but now it is perhaps priority number seven. The 
same is the case with UNRWA. 
When it comes to more internal reasons, UNRWA’s cost of providing services 
increases year after year. This is because the refugee population increases year 
by year, as does the number of staff. The demand for UNRWA services has also 
risen. For many refugees in Gaza, for example, UNRWA is now the only source 
of livelihood due to the embargo, the closure of tunnels to Egypt, and the death 
of the once active economy. 
UNRWA totally depends on voluntary contributions from governments. Its 
budget is not part of the UN budget because it is a subsidiary organ of the United 
Nations. UNRWA has not been able to find sources of funding other than the 
traditional ones. Ninety percent of its money comes from the United States, the 
European Union and its member states, plus Japan and some Arab countries. 
Saudi Arabia gives some contributions to the general fund, and there are also 
significant contributions from Kuwait and UAE. This is apart from the generous 
contributions from these and other Arab countries in the Gulf to special appeals. 
UNRWA has the regular budget, which it spends on the day-to-day activities: on 
the salaries of 30,000 staff members, of which the large part are teachers, who 
are Palestinian refugees themselves. The salaries and utilities take more than 
75% of UNRWA’s budget. For specific crises UNRWA has separate funds through 
appeals, e.g. the Gaza appeal that related to the destruction of more than 10,000 
homes in the recent war, or the appeal for the reconstruction of Nahr El-Bared 
camp in Lebanon. So there are regular needs of UNRWA, and emergency needs. 
I have calculated that UNRWA needs at least $1 billion every year. The regular 
budget stands at $620 million, plus additional funding to meet the special crises 
that erupt over the course of a year. 
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So the Syrian crisis was not the main or only reason behind UNRWA’s financial 
crisis. It is mainly due to chronic shortfalls, and the fact that the volume of 
contributions has not kept pace with the increase in the refugee population, the 
increase in their poverty, and in the increase in demand for UNRWA services. But 
many have come to the conclusion that this current funding crisis is deliberate, 
and that there are attempts by the anti-UNRWA parties in the world to gradually 
phase out the agency. 
Do you believe that? Is there really an attempt to phase out UNRWA? 
I do not believe in conspiracy theories. Not a single country from among UNRWA 
donors has reached the conclusion that UNRWA has exhausted the reasons for 
which it was established. All governments agree that UNRWA is still a stabilising 
factor in the region, and that is why governments continue to pay for UNRWA. For 
me, it is now more important than ever for governments in a region full of crises 
to contribute to UNRWA. But in my view the political importance of U.NRWA has 
now deteriorated because of all the other issues I just recounted, which have 
overshadowed the Palestinian cause. 
The other day Nasser Judeh, the Jordanian minister of foreign affairs, voiced 
absolute rejection of any reduction of UNRWA’s services and warned about the 
consequences of not bridging UNRWA’s current deficit. Jordan was concerned 
about UNRWA’s announcement that it would not open its schools for the new 
academic year unless the budget deficit was closed. I understand that next 
week the commissioner general will either say ‘ok, we are going to continue’, 
or ‘no, sorry, UNRWA cannot open its 700 schools in the region unless it is sure 
that it can meet the salaries of 22,000 teachers for one school year.’ I think the 
commissioner general cannot do this unless UNRWA receives assurances of 
funding. Unless the $100 million gap is closed, UNRWA cannot proceed.6
So the reasons for UNRWA’s financial crisis obviously go way beyond the 
Syrian refugee crisis. The question remains: do you feel that in Jordan – in 
discussions within UNRWA and among Palestinian refugees – the threat of 
a funding shortage has led to a sense of competition between UNRWA and 
UNHCR, or between Palestinian and Syrian refugee assistance? Is there a 
feeling that the Syrian refugee crisis is threatening UNRWA’s institutional 
survival? 
I have not felt much of that. People are concerned about UNRWA’s financial 
crisis in general; this is not new to them. As I said, UNRWA has become the 
only source of assistance for many poor families, and it has some 7,500 staff 
6 By 18 August 2015 UNRWA, with the fund-raising support of the Jordanian Government and the Palestinian Authority, was able to 
secure around 80% of the needed funding to open schools on time. More details here: http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/
unrwa%E2%80%99s-financial-crisis-relieved-schools-time.
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members in Jordan – in the Jordan field office and headquarters in Amman, 
including the teachers and health services staff. UNRWA is the largest importer 
of hard currency in Jordan, and it used to be the second largest employer for 
decades. By now it might be the third or fourth largest. So its continued presence 
in the country means a lot, apart from its role as a political symbol. To many, its 
existence assures the refugees that their issue is still in safe hands, and this is 
one reason why donor countries and host countries are interested in maintaining 
it. 
Host governments, donors, and refugees all want UNRWA to remain. The UN has 
renewed UNRWA’s mandate and will continue to do so. Given that these things 
are certain, I am not worried about the existence of UNRWA per se. I worry about 
the form UNRWA will take in the future. Are we talking about a healthy agency 
that is able to provide services, or one that has become an empty shell? UNRWA 
is now working on very narrow margins when it comes to budget lines. If you talk 
about the real needs of the refugees and compare them with what UNRWA gives 
them, there is a huge gap. Ok, not all of the refugees in Jordan need food hand-
outs. UNRWA gives food assistance to 2.3% of the total number of refugees, 
whom it used to call ‘special hardship cases’. Now the modern expression is 
the ‘social safety net’. We are talking about some 15,000 people, however if the 
government poverty line is used then 30% of the refugee population would be 
counted as absolute poor. There is no fat left with UNRWA; the deficit now cuts 
into the bone of the agency. The onus now is on the donors to allay the anxiety 
of the refugees and the host governments, to dig deeper into their pockets and 
come up with more funds. I believe that the General Assembly, which established 
UNRWA, should also try to find something in its budget. The deficit can easily 
be bridged if there is the political will to do so. I view UNRWA as an element 
of stabilisation and peace in the region. If you allow UNRWA to collapse, the 
repercussions will be huge. 
You mentioned past cooperation between UNRWA and UNHCR. If you 
think about the future of UNRWA, and of Palestinians as well as other 
refugees in Jordan, where do you see potential for working together on 
issues related to refugees, and what could be a way forward to deal with 
these funding shortages that of course do not only affect UNRWA but also 
UNHCR at the moment? 
I do not see much hope for cooperation regarding funding. The reasons why 
governments pay UNRWA are totally different to the rationale for financing 
UNHCR or other UN agencies. But when it comes to certain small-scale projects, 
e.g. establishing a library in a school or a computer centre between UNRWA and 
UNESCO for example, this exists. UNRWA director of education is seconded by 
UNESCO. Even the signs at agency schools read ‘UNRWA-UNESCO schools’ 
until about 10 years ago. There is an agreement from 1953 between UNESCO, 
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UNRWA, and the host governments that UNRWA teaches the curriculum taught 
by the host governments. So in its schools in Jordan, UNRWA teaches the 
Jordanian curriculum. When it comes to the WHO, UNRWA health programmes 
are set according to the norms of the WHO. Regarding children, there is a huge 
cooperation with UNICEF, and with UNCHR as well. So yes, there is cooperation 
in various aspects, but when it comes to fundraising I do not think that collective 
cooperation is feasible. I believe UNRWA’s funding needs to be identified as for a 
special purpose. But cooperation can work well at the local level and at the level 
of small-scale projects. 
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